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Foreword
When I arrived as Dean at the School of Industrial and
Labor Relations in 1971, it soon became clear that the
School was undergoing a very important transition: A
handful of distinguished faculty members, who had been
with the School since its founding just after World War II,
were in the process of retiring. A number of events were
organized to commemorate the distinctive contributions
that these individuals had made to the School over two and
a half decades. One of these was a Festschrift type of confer-
ence, later to be recorded in a publication edited by David
Lipsky, entitled Union Power and Public Policy.
Given the stature of the faculty members involved, it was
decided that "group treatment" was insufficient. Accord-
ingly, younger faculty members and administrators put
their heads together to design other means so that the dis-
tinctive contribution of the founding faculty could be mem-
orialized. A committee consisting of Charlotte Gold and
Professors Kurt L. Hanslowe, James O. Morris and A. Gerd
Korman fashioned the concept of an extended essay and
annotated bibliography on the wide ranging and distinctive
career and scholarship of Milton Konvitz.
Vll
VUl Foreword
The committee was fortunate in persuading Professor
David J. Danelski, then a member of the Government
Department of Cornell University and now of Stanford
University, to undertake the challenging assignment of
summarizing, interpreting and codifying the career and
writings of Milton Konvitz. Professor Danelski has ren-
dered an invaluable service in preparing this volume for
publication.
I would also like to note the leadership provided by
Dean Charles M. Rehmus in seeing this project through to a
conclusion. Many loose ends remained at the time that
Dean Rehmus came to the School and he has exercised
considerable skill in presiding over the final phases of this
project.
Finally, I would like to express my thanks to a small
committee of alumni chaired by Dr. Jacob Seidenberg who
raised funds to help pay for costs associated with this proj-
ect. It is a testimonial to the impact that Professor Konvitz
has had on thousands of Cornell Alumni that it took no
substantial effort for the committee to accomplish their
task. We appreciate the help our alumni gave us in creating
this fitting tribute to a beloved and respected member of the
ILR School's founding faculty.
ROBERT B. McKERSIE
Prologue
On December 3,1974, Milton Konvitz gave his last lecture in
one of two courses on American ideals he was teaching that
semester. At the end of the lecture, he told the class that he
was completing his career as a teacher but that his life's
work would continue. No worthwhile work, he said, is ever
finished. "The word 'and' trails after every sentence," he
quoted William James. "Something always escapes. 'Ever
not quite' has to be said of the best attempts made anywhere
in the Universe at attaining all-inclusiveness." Then he
said:
And yet the human mind and the human heart seek all-
inclusiveness, wholeness. This is why we look for the uni-
versal in the particular, why we so desperately seek to finda
law that would embrace whatever we know and whatever
we do. The soul always reaches out for infinity. It is like
listening to a great symphony, or sometimes even only to a
lovely melody: when it is ended, the notes continue, the
inner ear continues to listen, the heart seeks to penetrate the
great infinite silence that is always the beyond.
That is the way it would be for him. He would stop what
he was doing for the past 36 years, 28 of them at Cornell.
Just as the clock told him that time had come to end a
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lecture, the calendar was now telling him that the time had
come to quit teaching. He concluded his lecture with these
words:
But the word 'and' trails along-my life and work are by no
means finished. The taskmaster is still persistent. There is
more work to be done, and there are more days to dawn.
When William James found in New Hampshire, in the
region of the White Mountains, a house that he knew at
once he wanted to have as a summer home, he wrote to his
family about it. 'Oh,' he wrote, 'it is the most delightful
house you ever saw; it has fourteen doors all opening
outside.
'
Essentially, what I have tried to do in this American
Ideals course is to take you into a house with ever so many
doors, and all of them opening to the outside. The greatest
deprivation is that which we impose upon ourselves-our
self-made prisons, the doors that we ourselves close and
lock, and after a while we sometimes even throwaway the
key, so that by th€ time the end comes, we discover that we
had not even lived. If you take anything away with you
from the course, let it be this: let your life be a house with at
least 14 doors, and all of them opening to the outside.
And as for me, there are still many doors that I have not
yet walked through. They are beckoning, and I hope that I
still have enough of the spirit of adventure that will take me
through some of them. Like Thoreau, I long ago seem to
have lost a hound, a bay horse, and a turtledove, and am still
on their trails. This is why I must walk through more doors.
And I hope that you will do the same all the days of your
life.
Professor Konvitz will be remembered as an exceptional
teacher. What he wrote of Emerson could also be said of
him. He had students, not disciples. He sent them on their
quest for truth and justice guided by their own candles, and
he broadened and deepened their lives by helping them
discover and disencumber their own powers.
Konvitz's students had to figure out where they stood on
the important issues of their time, but they had no doubt
where he stood. First and foremost he believed in love-love
of God, love of one's neighbor, and love of one's self. By love
of one's self he did not mean self indulgence; he meant
treating one's self lovingly, intelligently, respectfully, com-
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passionately, properly. He meant developing one's God-
given potential, devoting one's self to his or her vocation as
Emerson did. The proper conception of self love is a key to
understanding how human beings should treat one
another. "Love thy neighbor as thysel£''' Yes, love thy.
neighbor intelligently, respectfully, compassionately,
properly. Acknowledge that others are equal before God.
Acknowledge that they are made in the image and likeness
of God and are thus free to eat at the tree of knowledge and
free to choose their paths in life whether they lead to the City
of God or to Sodom and Gomorrah. And in loving one's self
and one's neighbor, one loves God. For Konvitz, in wres-
tling with the question that was central for Emerson-
"What is he?" What is man?-answered it the same way
Emerson did. He quoted Psalm 8: ''Thou hast made him
little less than God and dost crown him with glory and
honor." Thus to love man properly is to love God. Konvitz
put it more elegantly on Edward R. Murrow's radio pro-
gram in 1953 when he stated his basic beliefs in these words:
"To feel the steadfast love at the sight of a living creature, an
almost unbearable pity for all things that are born and
suffer and die: in this is the love of God."
The students in Konvitz's courses knew that the person
standing before them was not only an exceptional teacher
but a rare human being who always sought to be true to
himself. They heard him for the last time on December 4,
1974.
""
At the end of his lecture that day, he told them that he
would never teach again. He reminisced about his early
teaching at New York University and the first time he
taught a course in civil rights. He said that his central
interest was always his teaching of the American Ideals
course at Cornell. Almost everyone of his books, he said,
derived from the course. It was not an abstract interest for
him, but, as he put it, "the very tissue of myself." Keeping
the course current, he said, kept him current. Keeping it
.[The text of the statements on December 3 and 4 appears at a later point in
!pis volume.]
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fresh and alive kept him fresh and alive. It was Emerson's
law of compensation in operation. He said:
I have, of course, deep and complex feelings about hav-
ing come to the end of my teaching career. I will not try to
analyze my feelings; there can be such a thing, I believe, as
too much subjectivity-which is not healthy. But believe
me, one thing I do not feel, and that is self-pity. This is a
poison which all my instincts reject.
If there is anyone feeling that predominates, I am sure
that it is a deep feeling of gratitude. In the religious tradi-
tion which is my own, we are required, when we reach an
event significant in one's personal life, to utter a blessing
that thanks the Giver of Gifts for the gift of life that has
brought one to the happy event. It is this emotion of thanks-
giving that I feel most of all at this moment.
For I have been among the most fortunate of men. I have
spent my days and years doing exactly what I so much
wished to do. Instead of the State of New York and Cornell
University paying me, I should have been willing to pay
them for having allowed me to do the work that I most
wanted to do. I have never learned the difference between
work and play, between work and leisure, between daytime
work and nighttime relaxation-I never knew where one
ended and the other began.
I say all this so that you may know that my interests are
not of a kind that I can suddenly drop them. I shall go on
with my work. Schopenhauer said that essentially a thinker
has only one or two ideas, and then he spends his entire life
trying to understand them, to unravel them, to explain
them to himself and to others. I still have a lot of work on
the one or two ideas I once acquired, and I intend to work
on them in the future as I have in the past.
I cannot help but recall some lines from Tennyson's
'Ulysses';
Tho much is taken, much abides; and tho'
We are not now that strength which in old days
Moved earth and heaven, that which we are, we are;
One equal temper of heroic hearts,
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.
As I leave you, I look upon you as representatives of the
many thousands of students whom I have been privileged
and honored to have had over the years, and I want to thank
you for all the supremely wonderful things that you have
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brought to me and done to me. You taught me many
lessons-lessons in courtesy, consideration, mutuality of
regard and respect, mutuality of honor, mutuality of
human dignity. For these and so much else that is beyond
expression, you have my sincerest thanks.
Thus, Milton Konvitz's teaching career formally con-
cluded. His career as a scholar, however, would continue.
By 1974 it already had been an extraordinarily productive
career that characterized a life of service.

liThe Making of a Scholar
Know then that the world exists for you. . . . What we
are, that only can we see. All that Adam had, all that
Caesar could, you have and can do . . . Build therefore
your own world.
-Ralph Waldo Emerson
Milton Ridbaz Konvitz was born on March 12, 1908, in
Safad, Palestine, where, three years earlier, his grandfather,
R" hbi Jacob David Ridbaz had founded his seminary, the
Yeshivat Ha-Ridbaz.! Milton's earliest memory was of
being carried to Hebrew school in a prayer shawl by his
father at the age of three. He remained at school all day, for
when he went home, he recalled, it was dark, and the teacher
led the way with a lantern. By the time Milton was five, he
was studying the sacred texts of the Torah, and by the time
he was seven, he was studying the Talmud.
When war broke out in Europe in 1914, his father Rabbi
Joseph Konvitz was in the United States seeking financial
assistance for the seminary. Concerned that his eldest son
would be drafted by the Turks and that his family would
suffer hardship in Safad, he made arrangements for them to
come to the United States. They arrived in 1915 just before
the war closed regular passage across the Atlantic. The
1. Unless otherwise noted, the sources for this chapter are several taped
conversations with Milton R. Konvitz in the summers of 1977 and 1978.
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Konvitzes had no intention of settling in America. But by
the time peace came, their children had become so Ameri-
canized they were reluctant to leave. So Rabbi Konvitz put
off his return to Safad, and it soon became clear that the
United States would be home to the Konvitz family. From
1915 until his death in 1944, Rabbi Konvitz led orthodox
congregations in Elizabeth, Trenton, and Newark, and for
many years he was head of the Orthodox Rabbinate of the
United States and Canada.2
Meanwhile, Milton educated himself for what would be
an extraordinary career of scholarship. A precocious child,
he spent a year in the first grade and then completed the
remaining seven grades in four years, an unusual accom-
plishment for someone who had spoken no English when
he arrived in America. Soon after he began high school, he
became ill and was out of school for a year, but he made up
the work and went through high school in the normal four
years.
Milton loved books and learning. He spent much of his
free time in libraries and used-book stores. In bookstores, he
would examine book after book, usually not knowing the
authors; if a title interested him, he would start reading the
book, and if he liked what he had read, he would often buy
the book for his library. Thus, while in high school, he had
picked up George Long's 1893 translation of The Medita-
tions of Marcus Aurelius, read a few pages, and was
impressed. He continued to read and decided to buy the
book. Surely it was worth a quarter. The book is still in his
library. It was typical of his encounters with great writers.
Once when he was fourteen or fifteen he noticed a little
book of Emerson's essays on the new-book shelf of the
Trenton library. He picked it up, started to read one of the
essays, and found that he was unable to stop until he had
finished. From that day on, he has been an avid reader of
2. After the death of his father in 1944, Konvitz wrote an essay express-
ing his grief,
"On My Father," Jewish Morning Journal, June 30, 1944, p.
7; and a poem, "Lament for My Father," Jewish Frontier, XI (November
1944), pp. 26-27.
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Emerson. He found that Emerson incited his own thinking.
A sentence from Emerson called to mind his own thoughts
on the subject. It was as though Emerson had been in the
room with him, talking to him. Later Konvitz wrote that
there are thinkers who talk to us and there are those who
answer us. The latter have disciples and establish schools of
thought, and their texts are used to separate the orthodox
from the heretical. "But they who speak to us are teachers
who seek to liberate the mind from dominant traditions and
schools. They have pupils but not followers. Their purpose
is to set each man on his own quest, guided by his own
candle. If their teaching has any content, it is that each
man's world is his own creation, that each man's world is
his own confession. They seek to broaden and deepen life by
helping each man to discover and disencumber his own
powers. They engage the soul in a dialogue and not in a
catechism. It is to this small company of thinkers who speak
to us that Emerson preeminently belongs."3
The little book of Emerson's essays that had fired young
Konvitz's mind had been edited by Stuart P. Sherman, an
English professor at the University of Illinois. Milton
noticed that Sherman edited the Sunday literary supple-
ment of the New York Herald Tribune and wrote a long
essay each week on some outstanding American or Euro-
pean writer. Each week he turned eagerly to Sherman's
essay and read it. Milton also read his books.4 Through
Sherman's writings he was introduced to Hawthorne, Ana-
tole France, Thoreau, Mencken, and other American and
European writers. Milton was struck by Sherman's idea of
Americanism. To be an American, wrote Sherman, meant
to hold certain ideals that are a permanent part of the
3. Milton Konvitz, Introduction, in Milton Konvitz and Stephen
Whicher (eds.) Emerson: A Collection of Critical Essays (Englewood
Cliffs, N.].: Prentice-Hall, 1962), p. I I.
4. Among Sherman's books that Milton read were Americans (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922); The Genius of America (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923); Critical Woodcuts (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1926); The Main Stream (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1927).
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nation's life. They are the spiritual mold in which one's
thoughts and feelings become American. They establish
our fellow citizenship with Franklin and Jefferson. The
notion of American ideals shaping one's political and
moral conscience would remain with Konvitz, and looking
back to his high school and college days, he would say that
Sherman was important in his Americanization. When
Sherman died in 1926, Milton felt that he had lost a friend.
Milton was not only taken with Emerson's ideas; hewas
taken with the literary form that Emerson used-the essay.
While still in high school he read the great essayists Mon-
taigne, Sainte-Beauve, Matthew Arnold and James Russell
Lowell, and later, in college, he read Carlyle, Lamb, Rus-
kin, Hazlitt, George M. Brandes, Paul Elmer More, Lle-
welyn Powys, and Odell Shepard. He enjoyed reading
essays, and many of his own writings are best characterized
as finely crafted essays.
As Konvitz grew older, he began to read philosophy. As a
student in high school, he read Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus,
and Schopenhauer; then one of Mencken's works led him to
Nietzsche. After Nietzsche, he read, while he was in college,
Spinoza, Plato, Kant, Maimonides, Leibniz, Aristotle,
Royce, James, Berkeley, H ume, and Locke, and later he read
Thomas More and Erasmus. And he read and reread Emer-
son, which prepared him for the idealist philophy of Plato,
Kant, and Royce. He especially admired Emerson's life-
his singular devotion to his vocation, his commitment as a
thinker, his unimpeachable honesty and integrity, and he
liked Spinoza and Kant for the same reasons. He admired
Erasmus for his courage and honesty and More for his
brilliance.
At sixteen, Milton went to New York University. He
lived at home and commuted on the Hudson tubes to
Washington Square five days a week. In college he did not
have much of a social life. On Sundays he would usually go
to a concert in New York. He published his first essay,
which was on the British Poet Laureate, Robert Bridges,
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while still an undergraduate. 5After receiving his bachelor's
degree in 1928, he enrolled simultaneously in New York
University's law school and graduate program in philo-
sophy. The next year he published two essays, one on
Robert Frost and Edward Arlington Robinson and the
other on Spinoza and Maimonides. 6That year he became an
editor of the New York University Law Quarterly and was
awarded first prize for the best law note in the Quarterly. He
especially enjoyed his work in philosophy. One of his pro-
fessors was William Curtis Swabey with whom he studied
Spinoza. He travelled to Swabey's office at University
Heights once every two weeks for a tutorial that lasted an
entire afternoon. He also had a seminar on Aristotle's Phys-
ics with Professor Philip Wheelwright.
While Konvitz was studying philosophy and law at New
York University, he wrote two articles for philosophical
journals-one on the ideas of Bradley and Fite and the other
on utilitarian justice.7 The latter's discussion of uniformity
and equality was a forerunner of much of his mature work.
To Konvitz these concepts did not necessarily have the same
meaning. Uniformity is a guarantee of equality, he wrote,
only "if the law is uniformly enforced among equals."
Then he went on to write:
Equality before the law can mean only one thing, namely
that a court cannot be a respecter of persons: that's a privi-
lege that only people have. And such an equality it is the
duty of a court to enforce even at the risk of making itself
unpopular and the community lesshappy; and this must be
true even in a state whose guiding political principle is
Utility, for the basis of this principle is the postulate that
every individual counts for one, and only one.8
5. Milton R. Konvitz. "Robert Bridges." The Arch (1927). 31-32.
6. Milton R. Konvitz, "Frost and Robinson," The Arch (1929), 9-10;
"On Spinoza and Maimonides," The Open Court, XLIII (1929),160-168.
7. Milton R. Konvitz, "Bradley's Ideal Morality and Fite's Moral
Idea!," The International Journal of Ethics, XLI (1930),1-13; "Utilitarian
Justice: Technical and Discretionary," Philosophical Review, XL (1931),
69-78.
8. Ibid.
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This passage is important because it would be the premise
of Konvitz's life-long defense of civil rights: courts have an
obligation to protect the constitutional and legal rights of
every individual, for individuals are equal before the law. In
this formulation, Konvitz suggests a solution to the prob-
lem of the potential conflict between equality and freedom.
In the public sphere, which is regulated by law enforced by
the courts, equality must take precedence over freedom.
Only in the private sphere-and then where not regulated
by law-may freedom take precedence over equality. Kon-
vitz's basic premise about the obligation of courts to enforce
equality according to law even if a majority of the commu-
nity opposes it anticipates to some extent the preferred
freedoms doctrine, which the Supreme Court later adopted.
In 1930, two years after he had graduated from college,
Konvitz received a master's degree in philosophy and a law
degree, which probably violated some rule against receiving
two degrees at the same commencement, but if it did, the
infraction was overlooked. His master's thesis was entitled
"Universals and Individuals in Spinoza and Leibniz."
When Konvitz began college, he already had some idea
of what he would like to do in life. He never thought of
becoming a rabbi like his father and grandfather before
him. When he was an undergraduate he wanted to study
Jewish philosophy, become proficient in that field, and
write about it. His article on Spinoza and Maimonides in
1929 was a tentative step in that direction. But he had to be
practical. In 1930, there were only two scholars in the field
of Jewish philosophy. One was Harry A. Wolfson, a young
Harvard University professor. The other was Isaac Husik, a
University of Pennsylvania professor, whose book, A His-
tory of Medieval Jewish Philosophy, was the standard work
in the field. Konvitz lived philosophy perhaps more than
any other student at New York University, but he did not
believe he could make a living in philosophy. So he would
become a lawyer.
In 1931, Konvitz began his legal apprenticeship, which
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was required in order to take the bar examination in New
Jersey. In 1932, he passed the bar examination and was
admitted to practice, but instead of looking for a job with a
law firm, he applied for graduate fellowship in philosophy
at Cornell. Cornell offered him one of its Sage Fellowships,
and he accepted it.
In the fall of 1932, Konvitz made his first journey to
Ithaca. His fellowship was for one year, and he made the
most of it. That year he completed all the work for a Ph.D.,
including the writing and defense of his dissertation, and
received his doctorate in June of 1933. Members of his
doctoral committee were George H. Sabine (political the-
ory), G. Watts Cunningham (metaphysics), and Richard
Robinson (history of philosophy). His dissertation was a
study of the early 20th century British philosopher, Samuel
Alexander, entitled: "Meaning and Value: A Study in the
Axiology of S. Alexander."
II
In June 1933, Konvitz would have liked nothing better than
a job teaching philosophy at some college or university. He
was a scholar; he had already published several articles, and
he wanted to teach. And nothing would have pleased him
more than to stay at Cornell. But Sabine, his major profes-
sor, urged him to be realistic. Because of the Depression,
there were few jobs in philosophy anywhere in the country
and none at Cornell. Further, there were very few Jews in
academic life, and Konvitz knew that anti-Semitism was at
the time a fact of life in academia. Besides, he was fortunate
to have a law degree and to be admitted to the bar; he could
get a job. Sabine knew how much his student loved the life
of the mind, but he nonetheless urged him to practice law.
Konvitz reluctantly left Ithaca for Jersey City and a job in a
law firm. In 1935, at the age of 27, he went into practice for
himself, and in 1938, when public housing under federal
law began, he also became general counsel for the Newark
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Housing Authority. But Konvitz did not relish the practice
of law. He yearned for the life of scholarship and continued
to write. And in summers he would return to Ithaca to use
the Cornell library.
Dean Frank H. Sommer, of the New Yorl<.University
Law School, knew of Konvitz's scholarly ambitions and was
eager to have him on the faculty, but the Depression kept
him from making any appointments. In 1938, however, he
created a part-time position for Konvitz and asked him to
teach a new elective course on legal method. This was the
first of many courses Konvitz was to create and teach at
Washington Square over the next eight years. Among the
courses he created was one in public housing law that
eventually covered not only the legal aspects of public hous-
ing but also planning and conservation. He also created and
taught courses on judicial administration, civil liberties,
and civil rights. Because the courses were new, Konvitz had
to develop his own materials, which he did during
summers, usually in Ithaca. The courses in civil rights and
public housing were among the first of their kind in the
country.
At New York University, Konvitz was a highly produc-
tive scholar. Between 1940 and 1943, he published twenty-
three articles, and fifteen of them dealt with civil liberties
and civil rights. During this period he was active in the New
Jersey Urban League, the American Civil Liberties Union,
the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish
Congress, and the American Association for Jewish Educa-
tion. While teaching at New York University, he also
offered courses at the New School for Social Research. He
worked closely with Henry Hurwitz on the Menorah Jour-
nal, and with Elliott Cohen on Commentary. He main-
tained a regular column or department in the New Leader,
Twice-a-Year, and Common Ground. At the New School,
his close friends were Horace M. Kallen, Felix Kaufmann,
and Max Ascoli. He was a member of a small discussion
group that met weekly at the Rand School and included
Sidney Hook, Max Nomad, Daniel Bell, I. N. Steinberg,
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Rubin Gotesky, Herbert Solow, and Sol Levitas. At N.Y.U.
he was closely associated with A. I. Katsh, who pioneered in
the study of modern Hebrew at colleges.
In 1943, Roger Baldwin, founder of the American Civil
Liberties Union, asked Konvitz if he would become staff
counsel of the organization and take the place of a young
lawyer who was being drafted. Konvitz had worked for the
ACLU only a month when the lawyer who had been drafted
returned because the army had rejected him. The ACLU
could not afford two lawyers; so Konvitz looked for a job
elsewhere. Several days later Thurgood Marshall invited
Konvitz to join the staff of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund. Konvitz became the third lawyer on the NAACP
staff and worked with Marshall and Edward R. Dudley,
who later became Ambassador to Liberia and a New York
State Supreme court judge. Marshall did most of the trial
work for the NAACP. Konvitz's contribution was primarily
analysis and scholarship: he spent most of his time writing
briefs and memoranda. Among the important cases he
worked on were Smith v. Allwright (l944)9-the Texas
white primary case-and Screws v. United States (1945)1°-
a federal civil rights case in which a Georgia sheriff was
prosecuted for beating a black person to death.
From 1944 to 1945, Konvitz did some soul searching and
gave considerable thought to his future life. He felt he was
being crushed by his many undertakings and the demands
on his time from the many organizations and agencies that
called for his involvement and help. At one and the same
time, he was teaching at both New York University and the
New School for Social Research, and he was assistant gen-
eral counsel to the NAACP and general counsel to the New
Jersey State Housing Authority. Despite such involvement,
he continued to write, and his output was enormous. In
1944 and 1945, he wrote thirty-one articles and completed
most of the work for two scholarly books. In addition, he
9. 324 u.S. 649 (1944).
10. 325 u.S. 91 (1945).
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revised his doctoral dissertation for publication. But he was
doing too much. He felt hard pressed emotionally and
spiritually. He concluded that as long as he stayed in New
York City, he would not have the peace of mind needed to
do serious, scholarly work, and he wanted to do that more
than anything else.
Thus, in 1945 Konvitz told his friends that he would like
to leave New York City and take a full-time teaching posi-
tion in law or philosophy. William Hastie, at that time
dean of Howard University Law School-later a distin-
guished U.S. Court of Appeals judge in Philadelphia-was
appointed Governor of the Virgin Islands by President
Truman, and he asked Konvitz to succeed him as professor
of constitutional law at Howard. Although he had several
other offers, Konvitz was inclined to accept the Howard
position; but in the summer of 1945, when the Konvitzes
took their vacation in Ithaca, Konvitz's former teacher,
George Sabine, who was then vice president for academic
affairs at Cornell, asked him if he would be interested in a
position in the newly created School of Industrial and
Labor Relations. Showing interest, Konvitz was inter-
viewed by Irving M. Ives, dean of the school, and President
Edmund Ezra Day. Thereupon he was offered an associate
professorship. He did not immediately accept the offer. In
New York, he discussed it with Marshall and Hastie, who
advised him to accept, saying that they thought he could do
more for civil rights at Cornell than at Howard. Thus the
matter was decided; Konvitz accepted the Cornell offer, and
in September 1946 he became a member of the founding
faculty of the first such school in the country. Three years
later he was promoted to a full professorship, and a few
years later he also joined the faculty of Cornell Law School.
And so in August 1946 he and his wife Mary-they were
married in 1942-and Josef, their son who was a few weeks
old, moved to Ithaca. Although offered many distinguished
professorships and high administrative positions, he chose
to remain at Cornell, where he was regarded as one of the
university's most eminent teachers and scholars.
Ch. liThe Making of a Scholar 17
III
Cornell proved to be the intellectual haven Konvitz thought
it would be. It was a symbolic coincidence that his Cornell
doctoral dissertation-On the Nature of Value II-was pub-
lished the year he joined the Cornell faculty. Also in 1946,
Konvitz's The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law 12was
published. It was the first book in the Cornell Series on
Civil Liberty, which at that time was edited by Robert E.
Cushman. The book was a study of legislation and Supreme
Court decisions concerning aliens and American citizens of
Asiatic descent that demonstrates that statutes and judicial
decisions often reflect popular myths on race and racial
differences. It was a prescient work that showed the direc-
tion that constitutional interpretation would take in recon-
ciling the American ideal of equality with public policy.
In 1947, Konvitz's book, The Constitution and Civil
Rights,13 was published. He had begun the work before The
A lien and the Asiatic in A merican Law and had finished it
just before he came to Cornell. The book exposed and
criticized statutes and court decisions requiring or permit-
ting discrimination against black people; it also analyzed
federal and state civil rights acts and showed how law might
be used as an instrument to achieve the ideal of racial
equality. Like The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law,
it was a prescient work that pointed the way to court deci-
sions like Brown v. Board of Education (1954) and legisla-
tion like the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In the early 1950s, Konvitz returned to the subject of the
rights of aliens, but instead of simply revising The Alien
and the Asiatic in American Law, he wrote a new book on
the subject, Civil Rights in Immigration,14 which was pub-
11. Milton R. Konvitz, On the Nature of Value: The Philosophy of
Samuel Alexander (New York: King's Crown Press, 1946).
12. Milton R. Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic in America Law
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1946).
13. Milton R. Konvitz, The Constitution and Civil Rights (New Yark:
Columbia University Press, 1947).
14. Milton R. Konvitz, Civil Rights in Immigration (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1953).
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lished in 1953. In explanation, he quoted Paul Valery in the
preface: "To take up an idea again, consciously, is to renew
it, to modify, enrich, simplify or destroy that idea." Civil
Rights in Immigration renewed and enriched the ideas of its
predecessor.
In 1954, Konvitz published the first edition of his Bill of
Rights Reader,is which was one of the first casebooks on
civil rights and liberties. It was followed three years later by
Fundamental Liberties of a Free People,16 which analyzed
historically the constitutional development of freedom of
religion, speech, press, association, and assembly in the
United States.
In 1961, Konvitz returned to the subject he had consid-
ered in The Constitution and Civil Rights, when he and
Theodore Leskes wrote A Century of Civil Rights. i7Leskes
brought up to date Konvitz's initial coverage of state laws
prohibiting racial discrimination, and Konvitz, in addition
to covering federal civil rights legislation, wrote trenchant
essays on slavery and its consequences and the constitu-
tional developments underlying the demands for civil
rights. The book was written during the year when Konvitz
was living at Princeton as a member of the Institute for
Advanced Study. During that year he also wrote three major
articles for the fourteenth edition of the Encyclopedia
Britannica,-"Aliens," "Censorship," and "Civil Liber-
ties," and he also completed work on the book, American
Pragmatists, which he edited with Professor Gail Kennedy
of Amherst College.
In 1963, Konvitz published First Amendment Free-
doms,is a casebook that grew out of The Bill of Rights
Reader. A mammoth work of almost a thousand pages, it
15. Milton R. Konvitz, (ed.) Bill of Rights Reader (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cor-
nell University Press, 1954).
16. Milton R. Konvitz, FundamentalLiberties of a Free People (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1957).
17. Milton R. Konvitz and Theodore Leskes, A Century of Civil Rights
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).
18. Milton R. Konvitz, (ed.) First Amendment Freedoms (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1963).
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was unique not only for the breadth of its case coverage but
also for its generous presentation of Supreme Court jus-
tices' concurring and dissenting opinions.
A year at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behav-
ioral Sciences at Stanford in the mid-1960s gave Konvitz an
opportunity to reflect on his previous work on civil rights
and liberties and to bring his ideas together in broader
perspective. The result was Expanding Liberties,19 which is
perhaps Konvitz's most important work. His essays in the
book, on various aspects of First Amendment freedoms,
civil rights, and human rights, are among the most subtle
and sophisticated in the literature. At about the same time
he wrote an article for Law and Contemporary Problems
that explored the philosophical and historical foundations
of the right of privacy.
In 1968, Konvitz gave the Paley Lectures in American
Culture and Civilization at the Hebrew University at Jerus-
alem. Later in the same year these lectures were published as
a book with the title Religious Liberty and Conscience. 20
The United States Supreme Court has cited in its opinions
Religious Liberty and Conscience as well as several other
works by Konvitz.
In 1972, Konvitz edited a book entitled Judaism and
Human Rights,21 which contained several of his own essays
as well as the work of other leading scholars in the field. The
work was followed by Judaism and the American Idea,22
which was published in 1978. Both works deal with therela-
tionship between Judaic and American ideals.
In addition to the works mentioned above, Konvitz
edited eight other books. Among these were the writings of
the legal theorist, Alexander H. Pekelis, Law and Social
19. Milton R. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties: Freedom's Gains in Post-
war America (New York: Viking Press, 1966).
20. Milton R. Konvitz, Religious Liberty and Conscience (New York:
Viking Press, 1968).
21. Milton R. Konvitz (ed.), Judaism and Human Rights (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1972).
22. Milton R. Konvitz, Judaism and the American Idea (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1978).
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Action,23 and the addresses of Cornell's late president
Edmund Ezra Day, Education for Freedom and Responsi-
bility,24 which Konvitz did at the request of the Day family.
Perhaps the most important of these books were two works
on Emerson: Emerson: Twentieth Century Views (with
Stephen E. Whicher),25 and The Recognition of Ralph
Waldo Emerson. 26The other works Konvitz edited were
Freedom and Experience (with Sidney Hook),21 Essays in
Political Theory (with Arthur E. Murphy),28 American
Pragmatists (with Gail Kennedy),29 and Aspects of Liberty:
Essays Presented to Robert E. Cushman (with Clinton Ros-
siter).3o In addition, Konvitz has edited, from 1952 to 1980,
seven published and four as yet unpublished volumes of a
code of laws and a revised code for the government of
Liberia, two volumes of the opinions of the Liberian Attor-
ney General, and twenty-seven volumes of the opinions of
the Supreme Court of Liberia. He was the founding editor
of the Industrial and Labor Relations Review, and edited its
first five volumes. Together with Robert Gordis and the late
Will Herberg, he founded the learned quarterly journal
Judaism, and he wrote major articles for International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, the Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, and the Dictionary of the History of Ideas, as
23. Milton R. Konvitz, (ed.), Alexander H. Pekelis, Law and Social
Action; Selected Essays (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, (1950).
24. Milton R. Konvitz (ed.), Edmund Ezra Day: Education for Freedom
and Responsibility (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952).
25. Milton R. Konvitz and Stephen E. Whicher (eds.), Emerson: Twen-
tieth Century Views (Englewood Cliffs, N.].: Prentice-Hall, 1962).
26. Milton R. Konvitz (00.), The Recognition of Ralph Waldo Emer-
son (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1972).
27. Milton R. Konvitz and Sidney Hook (eds.), Freedom and Expe-
rience (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1947).
28. Milton R. Konvitz and Arthur E. Murphy (eds.), Essays in Political
Theory Presented to George H. Sabine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1948).
29. Milton R. Konvitz and Gail Kennedy, (eds.) The American Prag-
matists (New York: Meridian, 1960).
30. Milton R. Konvitz and Clinton Rossiter (OOs.), Aspects of Liberty:
Essays Presented to Robert E. Cushman (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1958).
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well as for the Encyclopedia Britannica. For many years he
has been co-editor of the scholarly quarterly Jewish Social
Studies and chairman of the editorial board of the monthly
magazine Midstream.
IV
There is a pattern of movement in Konvitz's work from the
particular to the universal, from the concrete to the abstract,
from the practical to the ideal. The problems he focused on
were often the same, but he had deeper insights concerning
their solution because the levels of analysis and the
considerations he brought to bear on them changed. His
work in the mid-1940s-The Constitution and Civil
Rights, and The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law-
focused on civil rights-rights protected or granted by law.
By the time Konvitz wrote Fundamental Liberties of a Free
People in 1957, he was concerned primarily with natural
rights, rights that people have whether their constitutions
or laws grant them or not, rights men have simply because
they are men, for example, "the rights of thinking, speak-
ing, forming and giving opinions." 31Konvitz called those
rights "fundamental liberties." Then he moved beyond
them to consider the ideals that underlie all rights, such as
justice, human dignity, equality, freedom, and the rule of
law. Although there were intimations of ideals and their
importance in Konvitz's work in the mid-1940s, and there
was movement toward explicit use of ideals in constitu-
tional analysis in his work in the mid-1950s and early 1960s,
ideals did not become dominant analytically in his work
until the publication of Expanding Liberties in 1966; after
that, they were Konvitz's main concern. Thus the move-
ment in Konvitz's thought is from civil rights tofundamen-
tal liberties to ideals. That progression is the basis
categorizing his thought in this analysis and in the ordering
of the chapters that follow.
31. Quoted in Konvitz, Judaism and the American Idea, p. 185.
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The ultimate aim of government is not to rule, nor to
restrain by fear, nor to exact obedience, but contrariwise,
to free every man from fear, that he may live in all
possible security; in other words, to strengthen his
natural right to exist and to work without injury to
himself or others. No, the object of government is not to
change men from rational beings into beasts or puppets,
but to enable them to develop their minds and bodies in
security, and to employ their reason unshackled; neither
showing hatred, anger, or deceit, nor watched with the
eyes of jealousy and injustice. In fact, the true aim of
government is liberty.
-Baruch Spinoza
Few scholars in this century worked with more devotion
than Milton Konvitz to secure civil rights for the downtrod-
den in American society. He saw discrimination as one of
the nation's major problems, and he saw law as both the
source and the solution of the problem. His research
revealed that laws not only often permitted discrimination
against black people, Asiatics, aliens, and others but some-
times even compelled it. Statutes and judicial decisions that
permitted or required discrimination, he believed, had to be
exposed, discredited, and repealed or overruled. That would
be a first step in the solution of the problem; the second step,
he thought, would be positive action by government. Kon-
vitz saw that just as the law could be an instrument of
discrimination, it could also be an instrument of anti-
discrimination and social reform. He believed that the cru-
cial battles for civil rights had to be fought in legislatures
and the courts. "Laws," he acknowledged, "will not usher
23
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citizens declare to be the 'vast difference' between American
Democracy and Hitlerism."4
In the early and middle 1940s, Konvitz fought the battle
for civil rights in his columns in The New Leader and
Common Ground. They were often written in answer to
articles by well known writers or public figures like Arthur
Krock, Mark Sullivan, and Robert Moses.' Here are three
examples:
1. In 1943, soon after a riot in Harlem, Arthur Krock
wrote in his New York Times column that a majority of
white people want racial separation in housing and gener-
ally in public and private facilities, that their feelings about
black people are one of the "facts of nature," that most black
people are willing to have things as they are, and that
everything would be fine except for their radical leaders
who stir them up to revolutionary frenzy. Konvitz answered
that in our democracy, the rights of the majority are not
unlimited. Minorities have constitutional rights that
majorities may not legitimately deny. If majorities were not
so limited, we would have a species of totalitarianism-
tyranny of the majority. Thus the question is not whether
majorities want segregation but whether the Constitution
permits it. As for Krock's statement that when black leaders
call for change they are in effect stirring up deep and dan-
gerous feelings in their people, Konvitz answered that the
activity of the National Urban League and the NAACP may
irIdeed stir up strong feelings in black people, but that has
political value. What should black people do? Suffer
wrongs quietly rather than seek vindication of their rights?
No, he answered, they had a righ t to express their grievances
so that white people could learn of the evils and suffering
caused by racial segregation and exclusion.5
2. In 1943, Mark Sullivan argued in the New York
Herald Tribune that because the qualifications for voting
4. Ibid., p. 6.
5. Milton R. Konvitz, 'The Anti-Poll Tax Bill and the Constitution:
An Answer to Sullivan and Krock," New Leader, July 17, 1943, p. 4.
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are constitutionally left up to the states, a state mayconsti-
tutionally require a poll tax and a federal statute prohibit-
ing it would be unconstitutional. The argument was
wrong, wrote Konvitz, because a poll tax was not a qualifi-
cation for voting, and the Supreme Court had so held in
Breedlove v. Suttles. It wasa tax and thus a strong case could
be made for the constitutionality of a federal statute elimi-
nating it.6
3. Writing in the New York Times Magazine in 1943,
Robert Moses objected to an anti-discrimination provision
at the New York State Constitutional Convention because
he believed the term "civil rights" was meaningless and
because "[y]ou cannot legislate tolerance." What bothered
Konvitz was the implication that little or nothing could be
accomplished by black people through the law. Thus he
struck back with these words:
The term "civil rights" is no looser than the term "due
process of law" and "equal protection of the law," as those
phrases are used in the Federal Constitution. Congress and
the courts have put flesh and bones on these phrases, so that
they do have significance.
In our society you amount to something, as a member of
a group, if you have economic power, the law, or social
opinion on your side; and the law is important as attracting
either or both of the others. Without the law, the Negro
stands naked and undefended. With the law-the legisla-
tures and courts-on his side, he is on the high road with
hope in his heart. 7
But when Konvitz wrote these words in 1943 he was
aware that laws-both statutes and court decisions-were
used to oppress black people in the United States. In The
Constitution and Civil Rights, which he wrote a few years
later, he surveyed the cases and statutes that supported
racial discrimination. He devoted an entire chapter to an
analysis of the Civil Rights Cases, which had been decided
by the Supreme Court in 1883. The decision in those cases,
6. Ibid.
7. Milton R. Konvitz, "How Should Negroes Fight for Their Rights-
Robert Moses and Discrimination," New Leader, Aug. 14, 1943,p. 4.
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he wrote, was of far-reaching social importance, for it
meant:
1. Race distinctions with respect to enjoyment of facili-
ties in carriers, inns (hotels, restaurants), theatres, and
places of public accommodation and amusement generally,
violate no constitutional guarantee.
2. Individuals are free to make such distinctions
without interference from the Federal government.
3. States are free to make (or even compel) such distinc-
tions without violating any constitutional guarantee.s
His survey of state statutes compelling or permitting racial
discrimination in education, transportation, hospitals, and
other areas of life revealed more than 250 specific provisions
in no less than 23 states.9
Despite these depressing findings, Konvitz's main point
in The Constitution and Civil Rights was that there was
still hope that law could be used as an instrument to end
racial discrimination and to realize the ideals of freedom
and equality for black people. He based his hope on three
developments-the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Screws v. United States (1945),10movement in Congress to
protect the rights of black people, and the enactment of state
civil rights statutes.
Screws v. United States was a federal prosecution of a
Georgia sheriff and two other state law enforcement officers
for violating the civil rights of a black man who had been
beaten to death soon after he had been arrested. When state
officials took no action in regard to the killing, Screws and
his deputies were indicted under Section 52 of Title 18of the
U.S. Code, a provision tha t makes it a crime punishable by a
fine of $1,000 or imprisonment for one year to deprive a
person of his constitutional rights under color of law. They
were convicted and appealed. When their case was argued
before the Supreme Court, one of the justices asked a ques-
tion concerning the constitutionality of Section 52, and
soon thereafter the NAACP petitioned the Court to file an
8. Konvitz, The Constitution and Civil Rights, p. 27.
9. Ibid., pp. 230-41.
10. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
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amicus brief on the question. Konvitz was with the NAACP
at the time and worked on the brief. The brief argued that
Section 52 was not unconstitutionally vague, and a major-
ity in the Supreme Court accepted that position. "Just as the
decision in the Civil Rights Cases is of the utmost signifi-
cance for what it took away from the Negro (or failed to give
him)," wrote Konvitz in The Constitution and Civil Rights,
"so the decision in the Screws case is of the utmost signifi-
cance, for what it left remaining to the Negro." II The case
meant that black people still retained at least a measure of
protection of their constitutional rights under the few sur-
viving criminal and civil provisions of federal civil rights
acts. Moreover, it also signalled that these provisions were
no longer dead letters.
At the time of the Screws decision, Congress had before it
an anti-lynching bill and a fair employment practice bill,
and both had strong NAACP support. In countering argu-
ments that the anti-lynching bill was unconstitutional,
Konvitz argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Screws
provided an effective answer, for it had held that the concept
of due process applies to police matters preceding a trial,
and that includes lynching.12 Konvitz had no doubt about
the constitutionality of federal legislation against discrimi-
nation in employment under the commerce clause, but he
thought it was ironic that the evil could be reached only in
the guise of regulating interstate commerce. "It is through a
back door," he wrote, "that the new concept, the new
'immunity' of the right to work at gainful employment,
will be received into the Constitution." 13But whether it
came through the back door or the front door, he believed it
was high time that right received constitutional recognition.
Konvitz also saw a sign of hope in the enactment of state
civil rights statutes. Massachusetts had been the first state to
enact such a statute in 1855 when it forbade schools to make
any distinction in the admission of students "on account of
II. Konvitz, The Constitution and Civil Rights, p. 61.
12. Ibid., p. 80.
13. Ibid., p. 96.
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race, color, or religious opinions," and ten years later it
banned discrimination "in any licensed inn, in any public
place of amusement, public conveyance or public meet-
ing." In 1947, Konvitz could report that 18 states had civil
rights statutes of one kind or another. He warmly encour-
aged the enactment of such statutes and reprinted as
appendices to The Constitution and Civil Rights the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union Model State Civil Rights Bill,
the Civil Rights Bill for the District of Columbia, and the
civil rights provisions of all the states that had them.14
Konvitz had been right about law being an important
instrument in realizing the ideal of equality for black peo-
ple, but Congress was slow to act. In 1948, it was President
Truman, not Congress, who ended the policy of racial
discrimination in the armed forces by executive order. "In
the history of civil rights in the United States," Konvitz later
wrote, "this order ranks among the most important steps
taken to end racial discrimination." 15
The same year, the Supreme Court declared restrictive
racial covenants unconstitutional in Shelley v. Kramer,16
thereby eliminating at least some racial discrimination in
housing. Konvitz applauded that development and also a
series of decisions in the Supreme Court indicating the
demise of the separate-but-equal doctrine in education. In
cases like Sweatt v. Painter (1950)17and McLaurin v. Okla-
homa State Regents (1950),18 the Vinson Court laid the
foundation for overruling Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).19After
those decisions, the Warren Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education (1954) was, as a practical matter, in
Konvitz's opinion, inevitable.
But there was resistance to the enforcement of Brown,
and Konvitz was especially critical of President Eisenhow-
er's lack of support of the decision. Eisenhower had said
14. Ibid., pp. 145-229.
15. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. 260.
16. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
17. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
18. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
19. 163 U.S. 517 (1896).
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publicly that law could not advance ahead of morals; law to
be effective had to command the respect of public opinion,
and he suggested Brown did not. In 1961, in A Century of
Civil Rights, Konvitz wrote:
From the record it is clear that Eisenhower did not help
form a public opinion to support the school desegregation
decision, and by his failure to help the forces oflaw, he gave
a measure of respectability to those who believe that the
Supreme Court demanded too much too soon. Eisenhower
not only failed to support Brown v. Topeka; he went
beyond moral and legal neutrality by arguing, time and
again, that the law must fail when it is in advance of morals.
This line of thought did not state but strongly intimated
that the Supreme Court had gone too far or had moved too
fast and that its decree was, therefore, morally insupportable.2O
The main thrust of A Century of Civil Rights, however,
was the same as The Constitution and Civil Rights-that
law was the appropriate instrument for ending racial dis-
crimination. Brown had been a stimulus for the civil rights
movement that brought men and women-both black and
white-to the South to bear witness to what they regarded as
injustice, and some of them did not come home alive. Presi-
dent Kennedy used the prestige of the presidency to support
the cause of equality for black people; after his assassina-
tion, President Johnson did the same; and finally Congress
did what Konvitz had urged for two decades: it enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Though Congress had finally
acted, Konvitz thought it deserved little credit. The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was one of the most important enact-
ments in American history, but Konvitz believed it did not
make up for Congress's do-nothing record since 1875.
Further, the act had been wrested from Congress. Reflecting
on this in 1966, Konvitz wrote:
This fact about Congress has disturbing implications for
the theory of democracy that places primary stress on the
legislature, and for idealistic theories of law that are obliv-
ious of such profane things as economic and political
power. The Civil Rights Act of 1964was notfreely given by
but wrested from Congress by the power exerted by Presi-
20. Konvitz, A Century of Civil Rights, p. 256.
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dents Truman, Kennedy and Johnson; by the social forces
let loose by the Supreme Court under Chief Justices Vinson
and Warren; by the forces exerted by the spreading network
of state civil rights and F.E.P. acts; by the Negroes acting as
a pressure group; and by the international community
observing us and freely commenting on what it saw.21
Yet Konvitz acknowledged that power alone did not explain
the nation's progress in civil rights. The NAACP had no
power in the Supreme Court other than the power of con-
science, and Harry Truman's stand on civil rights, Konvitz
believed, was not a bid for power, for "he was not one to
gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles." 22 Power and
conscience both played a part in movement toward the
realization of the ideal of equality for black people in the
United States. Konvitz would agree with Josiah Royce who
said that "ideals win the battle of life by secret connivance,
as it were, of numberless seemingly unideal forces."23
Though there was still much to be done, Konvitz believed
there was now hope that discrimination against black peo-
ple would at least diminish, for finally the laws were for
them instead of against them.
II
The fact that Konvitz wrote The Constitution and Civil
Rights and The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law
about the same time in the mid-1940s is not surprising, for
they deal with the same subject-denial of civil rights
because of discrimination. Only the victims of discrimina-
tion were different. The source of discrimination in regard
to black people and Asiatics-racism-was the same.
Indeed, in the post-Reconstruction period, southern and
western members of Congress regularly voted together in
supporting anti-black and anti-Asiatic legislation. Many
state and federal laws, though ostensibly dealing with
aliens, were in fact aimed at Asiatics, for example, the
21. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. 265.
22. Ibid., p. 266.
23. Quoted in Ibid., p. 376.
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anti-alien laws in California. Thus there was for Konvitz an
obvious connection between laws concerning aliens and
Asiatics. Race and alienage were also connected in another
way. Birth in the United States did not in itself guarantee
first-class citizenship. Prior to World War II and even later,
black and Asiatic citizens were denied basic rights because
of their race; they were in a real sense, if not in a legal sense,
aliens in the land of their birth.
Konvitz's concern for the rights of aliens quite likely
stemmed from the fact that he had been an immigrant.
Earlier in this chapter it was pointed out that as a Jew he
keenly felt the injustice of discrimination against black
people and that he associated their treatment in the United
States with the treatment of Jews in Nazi Germany. He
probably made a similar association between Japanese-
Americans who were sent by the government to "relocation
centers" in 1942 and Jews who were sent to concentration
camps in Germany in the 1930s. Justice Roberts made that
association in his dissenting opinion in Korematsu v.
United States (1944) when he referred to the relocation
centers as "concentration camps."24 That the treatment of
Jews was in Konvitz's mind when he wrote The Alien and
the Asiatic in American Law is clear. After stating in the
book's preface that the number of persons of Japanese,
Chinese, and Filipino ancestry in the United States was
relatively small-less than 250,000-he wrote: "That the
smallness of a minority group is not always a factor tending
to eliminate prejudice or intolerance is shown tragically by
the history of the Jews in Germany under Hitler; for the fact
that the Jews constituted only 1per cent of the total popula-
tion did not save them from the wrath of the Nazis."25
Konvitz was severely critical of the Japanese-American
relocation and the Supreme Court's decisions upholding it.
"The Japanese-American cases," he wrote, "are in the class
of trials of Sacco and Vanzetti, and Dreyfus; they go beyond
24. 323 U.s. 214 (1944).
25. Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law, p. viii.
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the 'limit of tolerance in democratic society' when viewed as
upholding imprisonment on the basis of an expansion of
military discretion; they are 'a threat to society, and to all
men.' "26 He believed the relocation was based on racist
attitudes, and the following statement by Justice Murphy
also expressed his views:
I dissent. . . from this legalization of racism. . . All resi-
dents of this nation are kin in some way by blood or culture
to a foreign land. Yet they are primarily and necessarily a
part of the new and distinct civilization of the United States.
They must accordingly be treated at all times as the heirs of
the American experiment and as entitled to all the rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.27
As Konvitz pointed out, however, American law and
policy did not reflect Murphy's view. Resident aliens did
not enjoy the same constitutional guarantees as citizens.
They were subject to deportation without full due process
protection. For some, race was a bar to citizenship, and
those who became citizens could, under certain circum-
stances, be denaturalized. The right to own land and to
work in certain occupations-for example, law, dentistry,
accounting, and even mining and plumbing-was, in some
states, denied them.
Konvitz discussed these matters in The Alien and the
Asiatic in A merican Law, but he focused particularly on the
exclusion of aliens from the United States. Asiatics suffered
most under the exclusion policy, which was transparently
racist. Konvitz quoted a Supreme Court opinion in an 1884
case that stated Congress felt it was necessary to exclude the
Chinese "to prevent the degradation of white labor and to
preserve to ourselves the inestimable benefits of our Chris-
tian civilization."28 Subsequent legislation excluded the
Japanese and other Asiatics. World War II, however, had an
effect on American exclusion policies, and thereafter Amer-
ican attitudes toward Asiatics changed. In 1943, President
Roosevelt asked Congress to end the Chinese exclusion
26. Ibid., p. 279.
27. Quoted in Ibid., p. 266.
28. Quoted in Ibid., p. 8.
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policy, acknowledging it had been an historical mistake;
obviously it was an embarrassment since China was an ally
at the time. Konvitz believed that Congress should repeal all
racial barriers in immigration laws, but at the time he
wrote-1946-he thought that was "extremely doubtful." 29
"Repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws," he declared, "was a
Ii ttle miracle." 30If ending the Chinese excl usion policy was
a little miracle, passage of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 must be viewed as a big one, for it abolished
virtually all racial and color bars to immigration and citi-
zenship. Konvitz applauded Congress' action but only with
one hand. "Surely it is disturbing," he later wrote, "to recall
that it took a World War, a Cold War, and a Korean War to
bring to an end racial discrimination in our immigration
and naturalization policies. Had the Chinese, the Japanese,
the Indians, and other nations of Asia been given quotas on
the basis of equality with some European peoples, our
quota laws would have given them an annual total of
approximately a thousand immigrants, which has been
their combined quota since 1952, with no visible ill effects
on the American people; yet monstrous events had to take
place before Congress could be moved to perform an act that
had more symbolic than tangible reality." 31
After the race and color bars to citizenship fell in 1952,
Konvitz focused his attack on the national quota policy in
immigration in Civil Rights in Immigration, which was
published in 1953. The purpose of the book was obviously
to influence policy, and Konvitz openly gave his opinions,
and not dispassionately. As one reviewer wrote, "Dr. Kon-
vitz, an immigrant himself, writes with his heart as well as
his head."32 Konvitz urged that the national quota system
be abolished. He believed that the United States should act
on its ideals of freedom and equality and admit all persons
29. Ibid., p. 29.
30. Ibid.
31. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. 342.
32. William M. Kunstler, Book Review,
(1954), p. 102.
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regardless of their origins. He also urged procedural
reforms in deportation and took the position that no person
should be deported or denaturalized unless admission or
naturalization had been obtained by willful and material
fraud. On October 5,1965, Congress enacted House Resolu-
tion 2580, which ended the national quota system as of June
30, 1968. "The act," wrote Konvitz, "is not perfect but it
wipes out a form of discrimination that was an affront to
millions of Americans and to democratic ideals." 33
Looking back in 1966 on more than two decades of the
development of civil rights in the United States, Konvitz
could conclude that "the vexing and explosive problem of
prejudice against the Oriental has, providentially, been
largely ended."34 Despite lack of diplomatic relations with
the People's Republic of China, there had been since World
War II "no ostensible discrimination against the approxi-
mately one million aliens and Americans of Oriental or
Asian descent. "35He wondered, however, whether the prej-
udice in the United States against Asiatics might not have
been transferred to black and Hispanic peoples.
Konvitz was also concerned about the plight of Ameri-
can Indians, who were the first group in the United States to
be segregated by law when the Indian Removal Act was
enacted in 1830. He believed that the nation could "reasona-
bly be expected to help effectively a half-million Indians,
who are American citizens, to attain 'the adjustments they
enjoyed as the original possessors of their native land.' "36
III
The quotation from Spinoza at the beginning of this chap-
ter underlies much of Konvitz's thought concerning the
importance of civil rights. He believed that the object of law
is to give all men a fair and equal chance to develop their
33. Konvitz. Expanding Liberties, p. 343.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 349.
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minds and bodies, to live without fear and in security; that
is, to strengthen and protect their natural rights to exist and
work without injury to themselves or others. But when law
requires or permits discrimination against black people,
aliens, Asiatics, and others, as it clearly did in the 1940s
when Konvitz wrote The Constitution and Civil Rights and
The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law, it not only
operates contrary to its function, it infects the body politic
and causes further injustice. Thus he did not find it surpris-
ing that black people in certain areas of the United States
did not receive fair trials, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's insistence on equal administration of justice. Writ-
ing before Brown v. Board of Education, Konvitz explained
that one reason why the black person was denied due pro-
cess was that
the law itself has placed the Negro in a position ofinferior-
ity. If it is legal to discriminate against a person because of
his race or color in certain relations, why not in others? The
law says that some forms of discrimination are legal and
others are not, but the average citizen has no time or capac-
ity for subtle distinctions. To him the matter is plain: if the
Constitution permits him to stop a Negro from sitting near
him in a train or bus or school, or from living in the same
house or street or neighborhood, or from working in the
same shop, or from buying in the same store, then
obviously it permits white folk to keep Negroes out of jury
rooms; and if the law seesa distinction where there is none,
then the law is an ass. Bygiving constitutional approval to
some forms of discrimination, the courts open the door to
the practice of illegal discrimination.37
So there were two steps that had to be taken to secure
civil rights for black people, Asiatics, aliens, and others.
First, discriminatory laws and policies had to be abolished
or declared unconstitutional, as they were, for example, in
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and Brown v.
Board of Education (1954). Second, new laws like the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 that guarantee equality in education,
37. Milton R. Konvitz, "Discrimination and the Law," in R.M.
MacIver, (ed.), Discrimination and National Welfare {New York: Harper &
Bros., 1949), p. 52.
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employment, public accommodation and in other areas of
public life, had to be enacted. In the past 25 years both steps
have been taken. The promise of securing civil rights for
everyone, however, has not yet been fulfilled, but there has
been some progress largely because law has been an impor-
tant instrument of social change. Konvitz was correct when
he said almost three decades ago: "Laws will not usher in a
millenium; but in a democracy we have no more effective
instrument of social reform, either to bring it about or to
confirm it, than legislation and court decisions."38
38. Konvitz, "How Should Negroes Fight for Their Rights?-A Reply,"
p.8.
3/Fundamental Liberties
The God who gave us life gave us liberty at the same
time; the hand of force may destroy but cannot disjoin
them.
-Thomas Jefferson
Milton Konvitz agreed with Jefferson that individualliber-
ties were God-given. Freedom of thought, belief, con-
science, and association are fundamental because they stem
from our nature, or, as Konvitz would put it, they are
liberties we possess because we have been made in the image
and likeness of God. Those liberties are, for the most part,
personal and private, and were never given up to govern-
ment by the people. That is one reason why they should be
preferred and protected by the judiciary. Another reason is
that fundamental liberties-particularly the freedom of
thought, expression, and association-are necessary for the
operation of the democratic process. Those freedoms are
beyond the reach of majority rule, for otherwise minorities
might never have a chance to become majorities. Thus the
judicial process must keep the democratic process open, and
judges must scrutinize strictly any legislation infringing
those freedoms. The presumption of constitutionality and
judicial restraint might be appropriate in regard to legisla-
tion regulating other matters but not in regard to legisla-
tion limiting fundamental liberties.
Konvitz shared Justice Jackson's view that the guaran-
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tees of liberty in the United States cannot be enforced with-
out "the support of an enlightened and vigorous public
opinion which [is] intelligent and discriminating as to
what cases really are civil liberties cases and what questions
really are involved in those cases."l With that in mind,
Konvitz chose to serve the cause of liberty with scholarship.
He wrote both as a constitutional lawyer and as a social
critic, and he wrote for the specialist and the general reader.
He sought to enlighten public opinion and make it vigor-
ous in support of liberty. With careful scholarship, he
traced the roots of the tree of liberty, chronicled and pre-
dicted its growth, explained its function, and demonstrated
its significance for the good life.
"Religious freedom," wrote Konvitz, "is. . . not only the
crowning feature but... also the basis of American
society." 2 America was a haven for those escaping from
religious persecution in the Old World, but they did not feel
bound to establish colonies in which all could enjoy reli-
gious freedom. Yet their concern for their own religious
freedom affected their outlook on the religious freedom of
others, and that was the beginning of a process leading to
the guarantee of religious freedom in the First Amendment.
Konvitz eXplained it this way: "What they wanted and
demanded for themselves, they in time were forced to recog-
nize as a proper val ue for others. Religious persecution gave
way to religious exclusion; exclusion gave way to reluctant
toleration; toleration gave way to religious freedom; reli-
gious freedom developed into separation of church and
state."3 At the heart of this process was "the conviction that
I. Robert H. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of
Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 82.
2. Konvitz, Fundamental Liberties of a Free People, p. 6.
3. Ibid.
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the summum bonum in the life of man is the worship of
God in conformance with one's own-and only one's
own-beliefs." 4In matters of conscience, "it was considered
intolerable to delegate to others the power to dictate with
respect to them. To have religion supported by force meant
to put expediency in the place of conviction, and pretense in
the place of sincerity; it meant the subordination of life's
supreme and most sublime value to considerations that
were ephemeral and petty. With the passage of time this
came to mean that the state had no business to intervene in
the relations between man and God." 5 The roots of reli-
gious freedom in the United States thus were firmly planted
in the soil of both freedom and religion, for those who
founded the nation were religious indi vid uals commi tted to
both. Having the same commitment, Konvitz reflected it in
his writings.
His interpretation of the Establishment Clause in the
First Amendment is a good illustration. The essential
meaning of the provision, Konvitz believed, was in the
preamble to the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, which
had been drafted by Jefferson, supported by Madison, and
quoted by the Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion (1947), as follows:
Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts
to influence it . . . are a departure from the plan of the Holy
author of our religion, who being Lord both of body and
mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercion on either
. ..; that to compel a man to furnish contributions of
money for the propagation of opinions which he disbe-
lieves, is sinful and tyrannical; that even the forcing him to
support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion,
is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his
contributions to the particular pastor, whose morals he
would make his pattern. . . .
That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support
any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever. . . .6
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
6. Quoted in Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. 28.
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U sing the above quotation as his text, Konvitz explained
the Establishment Clause as follows:
The essential meaning is clear: I am not to be compelled
to support even my own religion. For God created me a free
man; my mind m us t remain free. For ifI perform a religious
act which the state requires of me, how can I be sure that its
performance is a sacrifice or an act of my heart? When the
act is compelled by Caesar, it becomes an act that is rendered
unto Caesar, even when Caesar compels it as ostensibly an
act to be rendered unto God. In any case, I am no longer
absolutely free; my mind has been invaded by Caesar; and
though I might freely render the act, had Caesar not pushed
me to it, his pushing me removes my freedom, or at least
renders my act ambiguous, and thus partly idolatrous
insofar as it may look toward Caesar, insofar as Caesar's
shadow falls upon it, or upon me as I perform the act.7
While the Establishment Clause protects against coercion
to do what one does believe, the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment protects against coercion to do what one
does not believe. "Taken together," wrote Konvitz, "their
purpose is not to degrade or weaken religion in any respect
whatsoever, but, on the contrary. . . to recognize and to
implement the belief that 'Almighty God hath created the
mind free'; and that man is not man unless his mind
remains free; and that God is not served except by a mind
that is free. Had God wanted a coerced worship, He would
have created not man but an unfree agent; and what God did
not choose to do, the government, a fortiori, may not do."8
The interpretation is truly Jeffersonian.
Konvitz not only clarified the protection of freedom of
religion by legal and historical analysis; his thought often
cut to the creative edge of constitutional interpretation. The
questions he explored in his Paley Lectures in American
Civilization and Culture at the Hebrew University in 1968
are illustrative:
What is religion? Is it possible to formulate a definition
without seriously hurting the spirit of the First
Amendment?
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 29.
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Does the First Amendment protect nonreligion and
atheism along with religion? Is it possible to protect reli-
gion without at the same time protecting, to some degree,
nontheistic and even antitheistic beliefs?
Does the Constitution protect conscience when it pro-
fesses to be nonreligious?9
The First Amendment does not define religion. Courts
have attempted definitions, but usually they have been con-
ventional, and Konvitz found them wanting. For guidance
on the matter, he turned again to jefferson's writings, par-
ticularly his Notes on Virginia (1801), in which jefferson
wrote that government has authority over only such "natu-
ral rights as we submitted," and "the rights of conscience we
never submitted, we could not submit. We are answerable
for them to our God. The legitimate powers of government
extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it
does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty
Gods or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my
leg."IO Konvitz found in jefferson's statement support for
the proposition that government has no constitutional
righ t to define religion. Certainly it has no right to question
the truth or falsehood, or the sincerity or the hypocrisy, of
religious beliefs. Thus Konvitz believed that courts are
required to give wide latitude to claims offreedom based on
religion. Like other preferred freedoms, it is entitled
"breathing space" for error and even dishonesty. "The First
Amendment," Konvitz acknowledged, "was not written
with the intention to protect imbecility and mendacity, no
more than that the guarantee against self-incrimination in
the Fifth Amendment was put in for the protection of
criminals. But just as there is no protection of the innocent
unless the guilty are protected, so there is no protection of
the truth and of sincerity unless the false and dishonest are
also protected." 11
Constitutionally, theism and atheism are opposite sides
9. Konvitz, Religious Liberty and Conscience, p. 25.
10. Quoted, Ibid., p. 53.
II. Ibid., p. 49.
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of the same coin. Atheism, wrote Konvitz, cannot be defined
without an essay on the history of the term's usage, and he
illustrated what he meant with these words:
The Romans called Jews and Christians atheists because
they would not pay the customary honors to the imperial
cult. The ancien t rabbis called atheists 'Epicureans'
because the latter denied that the gods interfered in human
affairs. Plato called atheists those who believed that gods
could be influenced by sacrifice or flattery to interfere in
human affairs. The rabbis of the Talmud called Adam the
first atheist because, by hiding from God, he denied God's
omnipresence. To some, anthropomorphic beliefs are athe-
istic; to others, the denial of a providential rule of the
universe by a being with exaggerated human traits is
atheistic. 12
It is obvious that atheism is difficult-perhaps impossible-
to define, and to attempt to define it for purposes of the First
Amendment is to court disaster. Konvitz supplied the reason:
"A hairline often separates the theist from the atheist; the
same man may be both at the same time, or either one or the
other on successive days or moments."13 Konvitz argued pas-
sionately in the following statement that an atheist might
even bear witness to God:
[J]ust as the believer may commit sins against God and
nature and man, so the atheist may truly bear witness to the
being of God who is the creator of nature and of man,
including him who is an atheist, For we must constantly
remind ourselves that though we may have beliefs founded
on supernatural revelation, we may be part atheist if we do
not believe that God has revealed himself also in nature,
which includes the mind, heart, and body of man.
But in His natural revelation, God may be deus abscon-
ditus, the God Who hides Himself and yet reveals Himself
in man's intelligence, in man's compassion and love, in
man's justice-in his conscience. And on these qualities
believers in God, fortunately for the world, hold no
monopoly. 14
The problem of defining "atheism" is linked with defining
12. Ibid., p. 57.
13. Ibid., p. 58.
14. Ibid., p. 72.
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"religion"; thus "for the Supreme Court to attempt to define
either term would make of the Court an ecclesiastical tribu-
nal sitting to decide issues of orthodoxy and heresy." 15The
conclusion to be drawn from Konvitz's analysis is that the
First Amendment protects "atheism" as well as "theism"
and that for religion to be fully protected by the Constitu-
tion, nontheistic and even anti theistic beliefs must to some
degree also be protected.
Konvitz has urged the Supreme Court to extend the
protection of the Free Exercise Clause to conscience even
when conscience "purports to speak in a language ostensi-
bly nonreligious." 16Quite likely the Court will do so in the
future, for Konvitz's argument is persuasive. His position is
that conscience is in some sense prior to religion as evidence
that man has been made in the image of God. "Religion,"
wrote Konvitz, "may enhance or degrade man; it all depends
on what it is. But without conscience, man has no dignity;
without it, man is not man."17 But religion is based on
conscience; therefore, in order to protect religion fully, it is
necessary to protect conscience. A fuller version of the argu-
ment in Konvitz's own words is as follows:
Since every man, believer or nonbeliever, is made in the
image of God, every man has human dignity, and a con-
science that purports to him, rightly or wrongly, to be the
voice of God. This at leas t is how the believer reads the facts.
Everyone, therefore, believer or non-believer, has a con-
science that has the power to impose on him duties 'super-
ior to those arising from any human relation.' He owes
supreme allegiance to the commands of his conscience. It is
not, therefore, a question of 'religion' or 'religious belief' or
belief in any relation to a Supreme Being or God. It is
entirely a matter of human dignity and conscience. A
believer, then, must affirm of his non believing neighbor
that he, too, is made in the image of God, and that he, too,
has a conscience, which has its rights and duties.
[I]f the religious person believes that religion is always
15. Ibid., p. 58.
16. Ibid., p. 105.
17. Ibid., p. 104.
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rooted in conscience, it is conscience that is primary and
religion that is derivative. Religion must honor conscience
as a child honors its parents.
To protect religion fully, it is necessary to protect con-
science, on which it is based and without which it could not
long exist. One day the Supreme Court will feel itself com-
pelled to recognize this fact and to give it constitutional
dignity,18
Konvitz thought that if Jefferson and Madison had fore-
knowledge of events to come, they might have written the
religion clause as follows:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof [or of
conscience ].19
Madison in fact included the protection of conscience in his
first draft of the First Amendment, and there is reason to
believe that it was his intention that the provision as finally
approved protect freedom of conscience. He not only wrote
the first draft of the amendment but apparently the final
version as well. "The wording, completely in line with
Madison's ideas," wrote his biographer, Brant, "undoubt-
edly came from him, since his House associates. . . had
taken no part in shaping or discussing previous drafts of the
article, and it was repugnant to the views which the Senate
members were appointed to defend. . . . Madison and his
colleagues knew what they were doing. English history had
demonstrated to them that without complete religious lib-
erty, without freedom of conscience and separation of
church and state, there could be no freedom of speech, or of
the press, or the right of assembly."2O This statement also
reflects the views of Jefferson, who often mentioned "rights
of conscience" in his writings.
If the Supreme Court adopted Konvitz's position that
the First Amendment protects freedom of conscience
whether or not it is connected with religion, it would take a
18. Ibid., pp. 102-04.
19. Ibid., p. 99.
20. Irving Brant, The Bill of Rights (Indianapolis: Babbs-Merrill Co.,
1965), p. 67.
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big step toward solving a problem inherent in the tension
between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. The
Free Exercise Clause protects certain actions if based on
religious conscience but not if the same actions are based on
nonreligious conscience. That disparity of protection
appears to violate the Establishment Clause. If Konvitz's
position were adopted and freedom of conscience was gen-
erally protected, the problem would not arise, for both
religious and nonreligious claims of conscience would be
treated the same.
II
Konvitz has a coherent theory of freedom of expression that
coincides a t significant points with constitutional doctrines
developed by the Supreme Court. To begin with, he was
not, like Justice Hugo Black or Professor Thomas Emerson,
an absolutist. He took the position that freedom of thought
is absolute but conceded that freedom of speech and press in
some circumstances may be limited. He was critical of pre-
vious restraints on publication (censorship) but acknowl-
edged that a few exceptions may be permitted-for example,
publication in wartime of sailing dates of transports or the
number or location of troops. He stressed, however, that the
exceptions "only serve to place in a strong light the general
condition of freedom of the press, which means principally,
though not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or
censorship. "21He acknowledged, of course, that a publication
that may not be restrained under the Constitution might,
however, be subsequently punished if it otherwise did not
come within the protection of freedom of the press. He
accepted a two-tiered approach to the protection of expres-
sion. He generally would subject political expression to the
clear-and-present danger test, but he wanted the test supple-
mented by other doctrines such as preferred freedoms. For
expression that comes within the rubrics of libel, slander,
fighting words, and obscenity, he allowed other approaches,
21. Konvitz, Fundamental Liberties of a Free People, p. 175.
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though not necessarily the approach taken in Justice Mur-
phy's opinion in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942),
which placed those categories of expression beyond the pale
of the First Amendment.22 When libel was granted some
First Amendment protection in New York Times v. Sulli-
van (1964),23and Justice Brennan introduced the notion of
the "breathing space" doctrine to protect expression, Kon-
vitz applauded the development and applied it to other
fundamental liberties.
Konvitz's short history of the clear-and-present danger
test in Fundamental Liberties of a Free People remains as
one of the best in the literature. When Judge Learned Hand
transformed the test to mean "the gravity of the evil as
discounted by its improbability" and a plurality of the
Supreme Court accepted it in Dennis v. United States
(1951),24 Konvitz wrote that the Holmes-Brandeis test had
been reduced to a phrase and suggested that we had lost "a
constitutional jewel." 25The jewel, however, was only mis-
laid, not lost. In Expanding Liberties, Konvitz could write
in 1966 that the clear-and-present danger doctrine continues
"to have appeal and vitality." But the lesson of Dennis was
not lost on Konvitz. The clear-and-present danger doctrine
by itself, he believed, could not adequately protect freedom
of expression. "Standing alone," he wrote, "it can be emas-
culated, as it was in the Dennis case, or lead to sophistical
rationalizations for decisions that in fact deny the funda-
mental liberties, as in Schenck v. United States [1919], Froh-
werk v. United States [1919], and Abrams v. United States
[1920]."26 The mention of Schenck is both appropriate and
ironic, for it was in Schenck that Justice Holmes first stated
the test when he wrote: "The most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire
in a theater, and causing a panic. . . . The question in every
22. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
23. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
24. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
25. Konvitz, Fundamental Liberties of a Free People, p. 340.
26. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. 292.
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case is whether the words used are used in such circum-
stances, and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree." 27This was the test articulated in an
opinion that sought to justify Schenck's imprisonment for
expressing his views. Holmes later used the test-but
always in dissent-in an effort to keep men and women
from losing their liberty for speaking their minds. In
Gitlow v. New York (1925), for example, he wrote in dissent
that the defendant's publication of a newspaper did not
create a clear and present danger and then went on to say:
It is said that this Manifesto was more than a theory, that it
was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement. It offers
itself for belief, and, if believed, it is acted on unless some
other belief outweighs it, or some failure of energy stifles
the movement at its birth. The only difference between the
expression of an opinion and an incitemen t in the narrower
sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence
may set fire to reason. But whatever may be thought of the
redundant discourse before us, it had no chance of starting a
present conflagration. If, in the long run, the beliefs
expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be
accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only
meaning of free speech is that they should be given their
chance and have their way.28
In the same spirit, Konvitz wrote in discussing Feiner v.
New York (1951):
A great many pages have been written by judges and
commentators who seem to be burdened with the fear that
the First Amendment may be used to keep out of prison men
who have the compulsion to shout 'Fire!' in crowded theat-
ers when there are no fires. There is much less cause for this
fear than is generally assumed. Among the things that
inflame the passions of men sufficiently to convert them
into raging, destructive mobs, soap-box or platform speech
probably ranks near the bottom of the list. After a crowd
becomes a mob, speech may direct the rioters toward one
objective or another; but no case in our system of law has
27. 249 U.S. at 52.
28. 268 U.S. at 673.
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raised First Amendment questions in such a factual setting.
Because of this relatively baseless fear, Feiner, the college
student in Syracuse, was sent to jail with the blessings of a
Supreme Court majority. The clear-and-present-danger
rule, when coupled with the 'preferred position' and the
'breathing space' doctrines, can serve to keep the courts
from succumbing too easily to fears that are more rooted in
emotions than in facts. The ideas that may incite to action
create no 'clear' and no 'present' danger. Their work is
slow, devious, and invisible, and is beyond the reach of the
law and its processes. When ideas openly incite, more often
they incite persecution of the speaker rather than the action
intended and hoped for by him.29
Konvitz did not accept Justice Murphy's position in
Chaplinsky that all libel was beyond the pale of First
Amendment protection. Long before the Supreme Court
determined the constitutionality of group-libel statutes in
Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952),30 Konvitz had opposed them.
In the mid-1940s, he wrote a memorandum on the subject
for the NAACP national board. It was a hot issue at the
time, and the American Jewish Congress, which favored
such laws, wanted the NAACP's support but did not receive
it because the NAACP board accepted Konvitz's arguments.
After the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
Illinois' group-libel law in Beauharnais, Konvitz wrote that
he believed the Court had erred, for the arguments against
the wisdom and constitutionality of such laws-
particular! y their poten tial for punishing poli tical
speech-were persuasive.31 Thus Konvitz welcomed the
Supreme Court's decision in New York Times v. Sullivan
(1964), in which Justice Brennan, partially rejecting the
Chaplinsky dictum, wrote that "libel can claim no talis-
manic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must
be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amend-
29. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. 301.
30. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
31. Konvitz, Fundamental Liberties of a Free People, p. 152. Recently
judges have also questioned the soundness of Beauharnais v. Illinois. See
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir. 1978). Com pale, however,
Justice Blackmun's dissent, joined by Justice Rehnquist, in Smith
v. Collin, 436 U.S. 953 (1978).
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ment."32 The Court went on to hold that the New York
Times was not liable to Sullivan even though it committed
errors in its publication, because Sullivan was a public
official and the Times had not acted maliciously. In justify-
ing this holding, Brennan wrote that erroneous statements
are inevitable in free debate and they must be protected if
freedom of expression is to have the "breathing space" it
needs to survive. Using New York Times v. Sullivan as a
point of departure, Konvitz wrote:
[F]reedom to speak or publish the truth can be enjoyed only
if one has the freedom to misstate facts, exaggerate events
and issues, vilify men and institutions, say things that will
make men angry or stir them to dispute-in short, engage
in 'excesses and abuses.' One does not need to say that error
has its rights. There is wisdom in Pareto's saying: 'Give me
a fruitful error any time, full of seeds, bursting with its own
corrections, and you can keep your sterile truth for your-
self.' He said this of Kepler, but it applies equally to many
others.33
Konvitz's analysis of obscenity in relation to freedom of
expression is sensitive and balanced. He had no doubt that
erotic works of the imagination like Lawrence's Lady Chat-
terley's Lover, Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate County, and
Miller's two Tropics were constitutionally protected under
the First Amendment, but he acknowledged other erotic
expression might not be entitled to such protection. He put
it this way in Fundamental Liberties of a Free People:
Eventually, one may hope, the Supreme Court will put
literary works squarely and fully under the protection of the
First Amendment. It will be impressed with the contention
that there is little or no information supporting the belief in
a causal relationship between reading a book 'that suggests
or incites sexual thoughts and the conduct of the reader';
that a line should be drawn between dirt-for-dirt's sake, or
'under-the-counter' pornography, and literary works like
Edmund Wilson's novel. . . . The Supreme Court may fail,
as others have failed, to agree on a definition of 'obscenity'
that will work successfully in all situations to separate
literature from pornography, but it can help clear the air by
32. 376 U.S. at 269.
33. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. 292.
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manifesting an attitude which will show. . . an awareness
'that stamping on a fire often spreads the sparks, that many
past suppressions are now considered ridiculous, that the
communication of ideas is just as important in this field as
in any other, and that healthy human minds have a strong
natural resistance to emotional poisons.'34
These lines were written just before the Supreme Court
decided Roth v. United States (1957),35a case that attempted
to do what Konvitz said was difficult if not impossible to do,
namely, define obscenity. Maintaining that obscenity was
beyond the pale of First Amendment protection, Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, defined the standard for
determining obscenity as whether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the domi-
nant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interest. He then went on to say that obscenity was
that which was "utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance."36 Although Konvitz welcomed the thrust of the
Supreme Court decision in Roth, he was critical of several
things in Brennan's opinion.
First, Konvitz believed that the historical argument sup-
porting the Chaplinsky dictum that obscenity was outside
the protection of the First Amendment was unwarranted.
He acknowledged, however, that if the Court had not
accepted that argument, it would have been faced with the
conclusion that obscenity was protected by the First
Amendment; at that point, the Court would have "to grap-
ple with obscenity under the clear-and-present danger test,
and this ordeal it wished, understandably, to avoid."37 In
seeking to avoid the entanglement of obscenity and the
clear-and-present danger test, Konvitz believed that the
Court was probably right, though he wished that it had
found some other way of avoiding the entanglement.
Second, Konvitz was appalled that the Court in sustain-
ing its conclusion that obscenity was beyond First Amend-
34. Konvitz, Fundamental Liberties of a Free People, pp. 169-70.
35. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
36. Ibid., at 484.
37. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. 185.
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ment protection, said that obscene writings are "utterly
without redeeming social importance." "This is a strange
and dangerous position," he wrote, "for the Court has no
right to go into the question ofthe value of publications. To
a Roman Catholic the publications of the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses may be 'utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance,' and of course Jehovah's Witnesses feel at least as
strongly about Roman Catholic publications. There was a
time when almost every solid citizen thought that all works
of fiction were totally without value, and thatno intelligent
person, having the world's work to do, should waste his
time on them, and even now there are millions of men who
firmly believe that their own 'sacred scriptures' are the only
books worthy of any man's time."38 As it turned out, a
different problem arose in regard to the "utterly without
socially redeeming importance" standard. Pornographers
used it in an effort to bring all kinds of erotic expression
under First Amendment protection. In exasperation, a
majority of the Supreme Court rejected that standard in
Miller v. California (1973) and substituted as a test whether
"works which, taken as a whole, . . . do not have serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 39Konvitz's
criticism applies equally to both formulations: the Court,
quite simply, has no right to determine the value of
publications.
Third, Konvitz feared that the Supreme Court in
determining what is obscene might leave the meaning of
liberty to local communities rather than the national com-
munity. "We are slowly overcoming the idea," he wrote,
"that equality should be left to 'community standards';
should we now open the door to 'community standards' as
criteria for the meaning of liberty, on the meaning of free-
dom of speech and freedom of the press? The idea is a
frightening one, and it is very strange indeed that three
Justices of the Supreme Court, induding the Chief Justice,
should propose it seriously. It is a capitulation to the states'
38. Ibid., pp. 185-86.
39. 413 U.S. at 24.
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rights attack on the Court that is the very opposite of crea-
tive statesmanship and concern for the integrity of the Con-
stitution."4O In Miller v. California, a majority of the
Supreme Court realized Konvitz's worst fears: it held that
relevant community standards for determining obscenity
under the Roth definition were local, not national.
Fourth, Konvitz perceptively pointed out that the defini-
tion of obscenity in Roth was different from other kinds of
legal definitions. "The reference to 'prurient interest' in the
Roth decision," he wrote, "is only a sign that points in the
direction in which the mind is to move when it seeks to
identify the obscene-as distinguished from the seditious,
the libelous, or any other kind of offensive material. In
obscenity cases, then, we work not from but toward adefini-
tion; and the definition is found not in a verbal formula
abstract from the obscene material, but in the material itself:
the configuration, the Gestalt, that is 'obscene' 'defines' the
'obscene,' just as the facts of an automobile collision
'define' 'negligence' and just as the facts of a fair trial
'define' 'due process of law.' "41
Despite his criticism of Roth and its progeny, Konvitz-
at least until 1966-approved of the Court's attempts to
grapple with the problem of obscenity in the interests of
protecting freedom of expression. The Court's assertions
that obscenity is unprotected by the First Amendment not-
withstanding, some obscenity, he said, is now in fact, if not
in law, constitutionally protected. The Court has given a
secure place to works of the imagination and has treated
them with the same care and respect that it has shown for
words that appeal to the political or social intelligence or to
the religious concern. The Court, Konvitz believed, "was
justified in seeking a way out of saying that the Constitu-
tion protects obscenity; for that could easily have been
twisted into the charge that the Court 'approves' immoral-
ity and sin!" What the Court has done, Konvitz concluded,
40. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. 221.
41. Ibid., p. 237.
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is let in the back door what could not come in through the
front door-"by providing 'obscenity' ample 'breathing
space'! The Court nowhere has said that it was giving
obscenity 'breathing space,' but a careful review of the cases
can leave no doubt that this, in effect is what has
happened. "42
Konvitz did not explicitly take exception to the Chap-
linsky holding that fighting words are beyond the pale of
protection of the First Amendment, but the logic of his
position on libel and obscenity would seem to carryover to
fighting words. Although the Supreme Court has not used
the expression "breathing space" in regard to fighting
words, it has in fact given breathing space to such expres-
sion. Indeed, in no case after Chaplinsky has the Court used
the fighting-words doctrine to justify punishment for
expression, a development consistent with Konvitz's theory
of free expression.43
III
Konvitz hailed the Supreme Court's official recognition of
freedom of association as a right protected by the First
Amendment in NAACP v. Alabama (1958).44For a unani-
mous Court, Justice Harlan said that association is broad
and cannot be limited to certain ends. "[I]t is immaterial,"
he went on, "whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by
associations pertain to political, economic, religious or
cultural matters." "With this sentence," Konvitz com-
mented, "the Court in effect revised Locke, who. . . failed to
extend his argument for freedom of religious association to
associations formed for secular ends. This language of the
Court makes freedom of association as wide a constitutional
net as possible, encompassing all human interests. . . . [I]t
surely must be conceived of as broadly as freedom of speech
42. Ibid., p. 239.
43. Gerald Gunther, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law
(Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1980), pp. 1219-20; 1235-38.
44. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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and press and must be interpreted and applied in the spirit
of the humanist who affirms with Terence: Homo sum;
humani nil a me alienum puto-'I am a man; I count
nothing human indifferent to me.' "45
The Communist cases in the 1950s raised dramatically
the issue of constitutional protection of association, and the
most important of the cases was Dennis v. United States
(1951).46 Konvitz believed the Court in that case emasculated
the clear-and-present danger test and "reduc[ed] it to a
phrase" when it upheld a legislative policy aimed at crush-
ing the Communist Party in the United States.47 Konvitz
gave serious thought to the problem and presented his views
systematically in 1957 and again in 1966.
His 1957 statement in Fundamental Liberties of a Free
P eop Ie shows some inner struggle, but he finally concluded
that if he were driven to take a final position on the case, he
would have to say the Communists were persecuted. But he
said he would add "that the prosecution was a beast that
could neither bear nor throw off his load, and now we are in
the same predicament with respect to the conviction: we can
neither bear nor throw off its load. This is another instance
of the justness of Thoreau's bitter observation: 'Things are
in the saddle and ride mankind.' "48 In expressing his con-
stitutional views on the case, he chose Chief Justice
Hughes' statement in Dejonge v. Oregon (1937), which
upheld the right of the Communist Party to conduct an
open meeting in Portland, Oregon:
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community
from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by
force and violence, the more imperative is the need to pre-
serve inviolate the constitUtional rights of free speech, free
press, and free assembly in order to maintain theopportun-
ity for free political discussion, to the end that government
may be responsive to the will of the people and that
changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.
45. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. 66.
46. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
47. Konvitz, Fundamental Liberties of a Free People, pp. 307-33.
48. Ibid., p. 340.
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Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very founda-
tion of constitutional government.49
In the nine years that intervened between Fundamental
Liberties of a Free PeoPle and Expanding Liberties, the
Supreme Court had decided a series of cases that limited the
holding of Dennis and the Smith Act, upon which the
Communist prosecutions were based, to the point where the
Act became almost a useless relic. But Americans had gone
to jail for conspiring to organize the Communist Party of
the United States, and one person was jailed for merely
being a member of the party. 50Reflecting on the Commu-
nist cases in the mid-1960s, Konvitz went considerably
beyond his 1957 statement:
The Smith Act and the cases which it spawned do not
add up to a chapter in American history that can be read
with pride. It has a nightmarish effect that evokes the
question: Was it all real? Could it possibly be that mature,
sophisticated men, in high office, could have thought that
America's security and freedom would be strengthened by
these actions?51
What troubled Konvitz about the Communist prosecu-
tions was that they aimed to punish persons for who they
were rather than for what they did. It was like the discrimi-
nation problem discussed in the previous chapter. Just as
persons had been denied rights because of their race or alien
status, Communists had been denied rights because of their
political affiliation. And in the back of Konvitz's mind was
the treatment of Jews in Nazi Germany because they were
Jews and not because of anything they did. Here is the way
he put it:
We cannot, as a civilized community, undertake to
attack persons, through criminal or quasi-criminal sanc-
tions, not for what they do but for what they are. It goes
against our conscience to give men a status and then treat
them differently from all other men merely because we see
them as having that status. This is the basic objection,
perhaps, to laws that call for different treatment of persons
49. Quoted in Ibid.
50. See Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. 127.
51. Ibid., p. 133.
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on the basis of their race, color, or religion-treating them
for what they are rather than what they doY
Soon after the Supreme Court decided Dennis v. United
States, McCarthyism became a phenomenon to be reckoned
with, and one of the questions hotly debated on campuses
was whether Communist professors should be dismissed.
On this question Konvitz disagreed with his friend, Sidney
Hook, whose position was that membership in the Com-
munist party by itself was evidence of professional unfitness
because the Communist professor was required to betray his
academic trust. Konvitz had no problem with the case of the
hardened Communist, for he betrayed his own incompe-
tence with his own words. His colleagues had no alternative
but to dismiss him, for "a person who, in his lectures,
professional writings or relations with his students, follows
the party line rather than his own conscience and intelli-
gence has no place in the teaching order." 53As for other
Communists, the problem is more difficult. Each case, Kon-
vitz believed, had to be viewed separately. The professor was
entitled to a hearing at which proof of incompetence
because of party membership was presented. But the charge
had to be incompetence, not party membership, and that
charge had to be proven to the reasonable satisfaction of the
faculty review committee. Members of such a committee,
Konvitz wrote, "ought to make every effort to be, atone and
the same time, hard toward those whose guilt is hard, and
soft toward those whose guilt is soft. Only in this way will
their judicial process be a sword against the guilty and a
shield for the innocent." 54And here some account should be
taken of the "breathing space" of the Communists' right of
association. Konvitz did not use that term, for it would not
be coined for another decade and then in the Supreme
Court. But that is what he had in mind when he wrote:
Emphasis on academic justice as a guarantee of aca-
52. Ibid., p. 164.
53. Milton R. Konvitz. "Academic Freedom, Justice," Cornell Daily
Sun, April 23, 1953, p. 4.
54. Ibid.
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demic freedom may mean that some Communists may talk
themselves out of punishment that they justly deserve;
but-if I may paraphrase Justice Holmes-for my part I
think it a lesser evil that some criminals should escape
than that a university should play an ignoble part. And the
university does play an ignoble part, I think, when a faculty
member who enjoys tenure is dismissed by the administra-
tion without allowing for effective faculty participation in
an orderly judicial process or in the administration of the
disciplinary rules.55
Konvitz understood that the associational rights of
Communists were our rights too. He shared Justice Black's
conviction that "no matter how often or how quickly we
repeat the claim that the Communist Party is not a political
party, we cannot outlaw it asa group, without endangering
the liberty of all of us." 56
IV
Certain themes run through Konvitz's discussion of funda-
mental liberties. They are privacy, breathing space, and
preferred freedoms with its implication of active judicial
protection of fundamental liberties.
The relationship between privacy and fundamental lib-
erties begins for Konvitz with western civilization's distinc-
tion between the "inner" and the "outer" man, for with that
distinction comes a cluster of interrelated dualities-the
spiritual and the material, the soul and the body, the sacred
and the profane, the realm of God and the realm of Caesar,
church and state, rights that are inherent and inalienable
and rights that government may give or take away, solitude
and society, and private and public.57 Fundamental liberties
are rooted in the domain of the inner man, that private
space where man can become and remain himself; they are
inherent and inalienable rights that protect and enhance
55. Ibid., p. 7.
56. Quoted in Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. 167.
57. Milton R. Konvitz, "Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Pre-
lude," Law and Contemporary Problems, 31 (1966), p. 273.
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individual beliefs, thoughts, conscience, emotions, sensa-
tions, and solitude.
Konvitz agreed with both Justice Brandeis who said that
privacy is the most comprehensive of rights and Justice
Douglas who said that privacy is at once the core and edge of
liberty. 58It is difficult to say where the domain of the inner
man ends and the domain of the outer man begins. That is
so, wrote Konvitz, because marking off "the limits of the
public and private realms is an activity that began with man
himself and is one that will never end; for it is an activity
that touches the very nature of man; and man's nature is, to
a considerable degree, made and not given. Man constantly
transcends himself, and in the process of transcendence he
discovers new dimensions, new heights, and new
depths. . . . Once man's power of self-transcendence is
posited, it becomes impossible to confine the self within
marked-off limits and to say positively, 'This is the self, this
is man's "own person," and the rest is not self.' ..59Thus, as
man changes, develops, transcends himself by the exercise
of his inalienable liberty, his private space also changes and
develops.
Freedom of religion is rooted in the private aspect of
religion, in the individual conscience, which, Konvitz has
written, "is, for modern man, the source and depository, the
energy and the agency of religion."6O Although the notion
of privacy of religious conscience goes back to Socrates and
the Stoics, Konvitz believes the most relevant manifestation
of the idea for constitutional purposes is in the writings of
Thomas Jefferson. Freedom of religion for Jefferson was
freedom of the mind, and "insofar as it concerned public
law, religion was to be regarded-and guarded-as a wholly
private matter, a matter of private conscience."6!
For Konvitz, the link between freedom of thought and
belief and privacy is obvious; hence that freedom is abso-
58. See Konvitz, Fundamental Liberties of a Free PeoPle, pp. 128-52.
59. Konvitz, "Privacy and the Law," p. 275.
60. Konvitz, Religious Liberty and Conscience, p. 86.
61. Ibid., p. 87.
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lutely protected against governmental intrusion. Freedom
of expression is also related to privacy but in diverse ways.
Libel laws, which limit speech, protect privacy. Privacy
considerations, on the other hand, argue against obscenity
laws. What one chooses to read or view to stimulate images
or sensations that are personal, particularly in one's own
home, Konvitz would agree, is none of the government's
business. It comes within the concept of privacy, and in one
case-Stanley v. Georgia (l969)-the Supreme Court has so
held.62
Konvitz also viewed freedom of association as linked to
privacy. In NAACP v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held
that in protecting freedom of association it had to also
protect "associational privacy." Commenting on that case,
Konvitz wrote:
Not every exercise of freedom of association needs to be
secret. If all organizations were secret, society would not be
open and free. Still, in an open and free society, there must
be protection for 'associational privacy,' so that, paradoxi-
cally, society may be and remain open and free.63
Konvitz's linking of privacy and fundamental liberties
has important practical consequences. Because privacy is
not only at the core but also the edge of those liberties, it
provides independent protection of them. When the ques-
tion is one of privacy, it is usually not necessary to deter-
mine whether a fundamental liberty protects some activity
such as membership in a church or political party, one's
reading, or the use of contraceptives. A prior question-one
that is essentially Jeffersonian-is whether it is any govern-
ment's business in the first place. If it isn't, the inquiry ends
at that point and the matter is settled in favor of freedom.
Privacy is related to the doctrine of "breathing space"
for fundamental liberties. Justice Douglas said that privacy
emanates from the core of liberties to their edge creating a
penumbra, a zone of privacy protected by the Constitu-
62. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
63. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. 83.
62 RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND IDEALS
tion.64 That zone of privacy is the "breathing space" that
Justice Brennan said First Amendment freedoms, which are
"delicate and vulnerable," need to survive.65 That space is
necessary so that the spirit of the Constitution can give the
document life. It is an area that allows for a margin of error
in favor of freedom. Konvitz found the doctrine appealing.
In discussing it, he wrote:
It is, of course, man who in the first instance needs the
'breathing space'; and it is his needs that generate the
penumbras and emanations. How much 'breathing space'
does he need? Which of his emanations are so essential to
him that they must become a part of the very definition of
the 'life,' of 'liberty' that makes up his 'own person'? There
is no definitive answer to such questions, since man himself
can never be fully delineated. His nature changes as it
emerges, as it is created. Society, through conscience and its
various organs, must constantly examine and re-examine
what it considers to be the nature of man, and its decisions
will in turn contribute to the emergent nature of that which
it examines. In the process of explication there is no room
for absolutizing. We have noted, for example, that property
is no longer a supreme value in our constitutional scheme.
But surely a man's home is his property, and his bedroom is
his property, and these certainly come close to his very skin
and bones.66
The preferred freedoms doctrine was important to Kon-
vitz, for it provides the rationale for judicial activism in the
defense of fundamental liberties. Writing in 1966, Konvitz
believed that overall the Court did a good job in fulfilling
that role. Discussing the Court's decisions in regard to
freedom of religion, he wrote:
[P]aradoxically, authentic religion has found its strongest
ally in one of the branches of Caesar's realm, the United
States Supreme Court. Like an artist, the Court has taken
parts of reality and experience which we hardly or seldom
had noticed, and has given them shape and form. Many
people, seeing the representations, were at first shocked; the
Court, they thought, should perform only a single task-to
64. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
65. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272.
66. Konvitz, "Privacy and the Law," p. 277.
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copy, to repeat, to repeat; but what they saw looked to their
eyes avant-gardist. But only haters of life insist on life as
mere repetition. Forces of life live by creating, by using
the old to create the new, by interfusing the old and the new.
The Court, in the church-state cases, even when its work
showed obvious imperfections and failures, dealt with real-
ity and experience in such ways that its work compelled
men to think, rethink, feel, and reorder their own sense of
reality and experience. Its work has had similar effect in
other fields too-civil rights and the administration of
criminal justice come readily to mind-but the impact ofits
work on religion and religious institutions is likely to be
the most notable and enduring, for there it spoke directly to
what is most vital and valuable to and in the spirit of man.67
Konvitz believed that the Supreme Court has also been
creative in speaking for the people as well as to them. He
put it this way in his discussion of community standards in
obscenity cases:
The Court has no way of discovering what are the
prevailing community standards, for it cannot conduct
opinion polls or engage in the Kinsey type of research. It
really decides what the standards should be in the light of
constitutional requirements, and trusts that the commu-
nity will, eagerly orreluctantly, agree to embody theconsti-
tutional idea, as formulated by the Court, in its institutions
and value systems. When the Court says that it 'finds' the
community standard, it means thereby to express its sense
of trust that society will not say that the burden of the law is
too great to bear; to express the idea-as in the desegrega-
tion or reapportionment cases-that it speaks for the peo-
ple as well as to them. Understood in these senses, the
Court's 'report' on contemporary community standards is
philosophically and constitutionally justified, and reason-
able, provided we bear in mind that the Court's decisions
themselves need to be taken into account as we discuss
community standards, attitudes, and ideals.68
Despite the tests and doctrines-clear and present
danger, privacy, breathing space, and preferred freedoms-
Konvitz knew that judges balance freedoms against other
67. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. 46.
68. Ibid., p. 232.
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interests, and sometimes freedoms are lost in the process. It
concerned him, but he remained optimis tic:
[Freedoms] are always being 'balanced'; and in the tug of
war between the state's men and the rights men, the consti-
tutional freedoms have a precarious career. 'The louder he
talked of his honor,' Emerson wrote, 'the faster we counted
our spoons.' There are times when we must feel this way
about Supreme Court opinions-there are the broad, gener-
ous, sparkling generalities, but a decision that takes away
almost all that was promised. Yet it would be sinful to be
dominated by such gloomy and petty thoughts as one
reviews the record. The freedoms have much more than a
fighting chance when they are challenged; and it is doubt-
ful if men have a right to ask for more in a world in which
certainty is generally only a snare or a delusion.69
Thus, Konvitz, like Jefferson, remained hopeful that lib-
erty, though ever under attack, will in the end prevail.
69. Ibid., p. 101.
4/ Judaic and American Ideals
I see myself indissolubly as both an American and a
Jew. I could not, for the life of me, ever say where one
ends and the other begins. I know, of course, that one
can be an American without being a Jew, and that one
can be a Jew without being an American. But my
concern here is not with being but ideals and values.
Ideals may have their sources in a specific tradition, but
their nature is to transcend the limits imposed by time
and space, by nations, states, churches, and other
institutions.
-Milton R. Konvitz
Konvitz labored a lifetime in a garden of "ideals that long
for realization," a garden in which he observed andencour-
aged "the emergence and flowering of human values." I His
commitment to humane ideals was so strong that at times
he felt as if they had a life of their own and that when they
were voiced by judges, legislators, and visionaries, the
words expressing them seemed to come "from somewhere
else."2 Konvitz's conception of ideals was, however, com-
plex, for he agreed with Josiah Royce, who wrote in 1892
that ideals are
nobody's arbitrary invention, no gift from above, no out-
come of a social compact, no immediate expression of
reason, but the slowly formed concretion of ages of blind
effort, unconscious, but wise in its unconsciousness, often
selfish, but humane even in its selfishness. The ideals win
the battle of life by secret connivance, as it were, of number-
less seemingly un-ideal forces. Climate, hunger, commerce,
authority, superstition, war, cruelty, toil, greed, compro-
I. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. xv.
2. Ibid.
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mise, tradition, conservatism, loyalty, sloth-all these
cooperate, through countless ages, with a hundred discern-
able tendencies, to build up a civilization. And civilization
itself is, in consequence, a much deeper thing than appears
on the surface of our consciousness.3
Thus to Konvitz ideals are the products of struggle and
experience. They are imbedded in tradition, but their
meaning is not wholly fixed. An ideal like freedom or
equality becomes understood as men and women strive to
achieve it. "Meanings are forced outof it," he wrote in 1958,
"by events, by facts-even as events or facts are forced out of
values. There is an inextricable interplay between facts and
val ues, between events and ideals, between means and goals.
Our ideals are never wholly set; our goals are never wholly
fixed-they undergo changes as people seek to attain or to
defeat them. And facts are never altogether cold, neutral, or
profane, as if they had never been touched by values. Facts
make policy even as policy makes facts."4 To know the
meaning of ideals, then, requires scholarship, mastery of
history and tradition, and philosophical reflection; that,
plus a deep understanding of the Scriptures, is what Konvitz
brought to his ideals-oriented analysis of constitutional
problems.
Konvitz's early training in Hebrew Scriptures and his boy-
hood reading-especially of Emerson and Plato-provided
a basis for an interest in ideals. His doctoral dissertation on
the philosophy of Samuel Alexander, which he wrote at
Cornell in 1933, already showed a concern for ideals. The
early pages of the published version of the dissertation-On
the Nature of Value-contain a criticism of Joseph Wood
Krutch's attempt to disvalue values, which Konvitz found
3. Ibid., p. 376.
4. Milton R. Konvitz, "The Use of Intelligence in Advancement of
Civil Rights," in Konvitz and Rossiter, eds., Aspects of Liberties, p. 88,
note p. 79.
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symptomatic of the times. He described Krutch's position as
follows:
With the pathos of one who lives on locusts and wild honey,
he cries that the world has suddenly become empty of all
truth, goodness, beauty. That which to our fathers was so
variously lovely and good, is to the sons and daughters a
place of darkness, inhabited by creatures who, in Carlyle's
epithet, are barely more than featherless bipeds; men who
claim no glorious heritage and foresee no splendid destiny;
too puny on life's stage to be taken for tragic heroes, too
honest to pretend to be heroic tragedians; tender in their
copulations, but never knowing chivalry in love; only
remembering, what their fathers have told them, that once
upon a time, even when they went in to the daughters of
men, human beings thought they were the sons of God;
faintly and sadly recalling that their mothers would put
them to sleep with bewitching tales of One called God, but
who, they now know better (since the descent from the
mountain of Nietzsche's Zarathustra), is as dead as the
squirrel that gathered nuts in the woods some score years
ago.5
Konvitz found Alexander's philosophy worthy of study, not
because he agreed with all of it-he did not-but because it
rejected the position described above. Alexanderwasa natu-
ralistic philosopher who believed that right and wrong are
man-made but are not for that reason artificial or conven-
tional:
"
'Right represents human nature at its best,' "wrote
Konvitz eXplaining Alexander's views, "and what is best, as
what is true, is the discovery not of unaided intuition or
reason, but of experiment; 'it is an expedient struck out in
an effort to maxi mise satisfactions.' "6 That was not pre-
cisely Konvitz's view on values, but he found the notion of
"right" representing human nature at its best, that is, as an
ideal, appealing.
Konvitz believed that Supreme Court decisions reflected
the development of American ideals; hence one semester of
his course, Development of American Ideals-ILR 308-
5. Konvitz, The Nature of Value, p. 4.
6. Ibid., p. 10.
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was based almost entirely on Supreme Court opinions cov-
ering civil rights and fundamental liberties. The other
semester-ILR 309-covered the basic sources of American
ideals. Konvitz organized those sources under six headings
for the purpose of reading assignments-Biblical sources:
Genesis, Deuteronomy, Isaiah, Amos, Hosea, Micah, Eccle-
siastes, Job, Jeremiah, Maccabees, the Gospels, and Corin-
thians; Hellenic sources: Sophocles, Theban Plays, and
Plato, Apology and Crito; Hellenistic sources: Marcus
Aurelius, Meditations, Apocrypha: Wisdom of Solo-
mon; Renaissance sources: More, UtoPia, and Eras-
mus, Praise of Folly; English sources: Locke, Treatise on
Civil Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration;
American transcendentalism: various selections from the
works of Emerson, American pragmatism: selections from
the works of Emerson, William James, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., Horace M. Kallen, and Sidney Hook. These
were not the only sources of American ideals for Konvitz,
but they are mentioned again and again in his books. Also
mentioned frequently are the writings of Jefferson, Madi-
son, Paine, Lincoln, Thoreau, Whitman, Spinoza, Kant,
and Maimonides.
Some of the works Konvitz assigned his students-the
Bible, Emerson's essays, Marcus Aurelius' Meditations-he
had read initially before he was sixteen. In college he had
read Spinoza, Plato, Kant, Maimonides, James, and Locke,
and while he was in law school, he had published an article
on Spinoza and Maimonides. In view of his interest in these
philosophers, it is not surprising that he had chosen to
write his doctoral dissertation on the subject of values. His
scholarly work clearly had direction from the beginning,
and it led-inevitably, it seems-to serious thought and
writing about ideals.
II
Konvitz's emphasis on ideals was not pronounced in his
first two constitutional studies, but it was present. Both
Ch. 4/ Judaic and American Ideals 69
American and Judaic ideals underline The Alien and the
Asiatic in American Law, which he wrote in the mid-1940's.
In the preface of that study, he wrote that Americans are no
longer a loosely composed people; they "make up an
organic, integrated society, molded by a common history
and common ideals." 7 Konvitz believed that some of Justice
Murphy's opinions discussed in the book identified those
ideals. He quoted, for example, Murphy's statement in
Hirabayashi v. United States (1943): "Distinctions based on
color and ancestry are utterly inconsistent with our tradi-
tions and ideals. They are at variance with the principles for
which we are now waging war."8 Though often Murphy
spoke only for himself, Konvitz thought that millions of
Americans agreed with him that "the strength of this nation
is weakened more by those who suppress the freedom of
others than by those who are allowed to think and act as
their consciences dictate," and that "only by zealously
guarding the rights of the most humble, the most unor-
thodox and the most despised among us can freedom flour-
ish and endure in our land."9
The mention of Judaic ideals in the book was both
subtle and profound. It was a quotation from Leviticus-
the only reference to Scripture in the book-on the title
page:
And if a stranger sojourn with thee in your land, ye shall
not vex him. But the stranger that dwelleth with you shall
be unto you as one born among you, and thou shalt love
him as thyself. to
Here we have the ideals of love and human dignity. Neither
was discussed in the body of the book, but clearly both were
the basis of his analysis of the rights of aliens and persons of
Asiatic descent in the United States.
In The Constitution and Civil Rights, Konvitz's second
book, he again mentioned ideals in the preface but did not
7. Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatir in Ameriran Law, pp. viii-ix.
8. Quoted, Ibid., p. 248.
9. Quoted, Ibid., p. ix.
10. Ibid., title page.
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explicitly discuss them in the body of the book. He said that
he hoped that the subject of the book would be important
not only to "the Negro, the Asiatic, the Catholic, the Jew
and other minority groups, but to the average American
citizen who claims devotion to the ideals of democracy, a
belief in equality, and dedication to the principles of free-
dom." "Freedom," he went on, "comes only from law; but
not all law gives freedom."11 The main point of the book
was that law as an instrument was often misused, and as a
result some Americans were second-class citizens. The
remedy Konvitz saw was the realization of the ideals of
equality and freedom through the proper use of law.
Ideals were prominently discussed in Civil Rights in
Immigration, which Konvitz wrote in the early 1950s, and
not only in the preface. One of the book's main points was
that the immigration quota policy in the McCarran Act was
inconsistent with basic American ideals. Senator McCar-
ran's main argument for the quota system was assimilation.
Immigrants from Northern and Western Europe, he
argued, were more assimilable than immigrants from other
areas of the world because of the similarity of their cultural
background to principal components of the American pop-
ulation. Konvitz thought that McCarran had emphasized
the wrong ideal. "Freedom" and "individuality," he wrote,
"are better keys than assimilation with which to unlock the
treasures of the American genius, character, and culture." 12
Konvitz's evidence for the ideals of freedom and individual-
ity came from Supreme Court opinions written by Justices
Jackson, Murphy, and Frankfurter.l3 He then quoted the
following statement from the Report of the President's
Committee on Civil Rights, which had been issued in 1947:
We abhor the totalitarian arrogance which makes one man
say that he will respect another man as his equal only if he
has 'my race, my religion, my political views, my social
II. Konvitz, The Constitution and Civil Rights, p. viii.
12. Konvitz, Civil Rights in Immigration, p. 60.
13. Ibid., pp. 60-62.
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position.' In our land men are equal, but they are free to be
differenL14
The final words of the statement-"In our land men are. . .
free to be different" -he added, "echo the language of Jef-
ferson, Madison, Emerson, Lincoln, Whitman, and Wil-
liam James."15 At the end of his analysis, he concluded:
"Were it not for our diversities, we would not be as free as we
are. Were it not for our freedom, we would not be as strong
as we are."16
Konvitz also appealed to Biblical ideals in making pol-
icy recommendations in Civil Rights in Immigration. In
urging that aliens who entered the United States legally be
subject to the same laws as others if they commi t crimes or
subversive acts, he quoted Leviticus: "Ye shall have one
manner of law, as well for the stranger, as for one of your
country: for I am the Lord your God." 17And, in urging that
citizenship be given generously even to ex-Communists, he
quoted Paul's letter to the Galatians: "Brethren, if a man be
overtaken in a fault, ye which are spiritual, restore such an
one in the spirit of meekness."IB Perhaps we are afraid, he
said, but "to show fear in the face of aliens who admit
former membership in the Communist Party is to debase
ourselves and to place too great a reliance on fear." He then
quoted John: "There is no fear in love." 19
Fundamental Liberties of a Free People, which Konvitz
wrote in the mid-1950s dealt generally with the American
ideal of freedom. Konvitz did not, however, discuss it explic-
itly the way he discussed ideals in Civil Rights in Immigration.
But in his next book, A Century of Civil Rights, which he wrote
with Theodore Leskes in the early 1960s, Konvitz focused on
the ideal of human dignity and considered it at some length.
Quoting Whitehead, he said that before the idea of human
14. Quoted in Ibid., p. 63.
IS. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 65.
17. Ibid., p. 131.
18. Ibid., p. 158.
19. Ibid.
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dignity had shattered slavery it had become "a hidden living
force, haunting humanity and even appearing in special-
ized guise as compulsory on action by reason of its appeal to
the uneasy conscience of the age."20 Today, he wrote, the
right to human dignity means "the right to be free from
humiliation and insult, the right to refuse to wear a badge of
racial inferiority at any time or place. Without this sense of
human dignity, one is not fully human."21
Beginning with the publication of Expanding Liberties
in 1966, ideals-both Judaic and American-became the
principal theme of Konvitz's work. Expanding Liberties
discussed the nature of ideals, considered specific ideals like
equality, applied ideals to specific problems, and concluded
with a chapter devoted to the interdependency of ideals in
the world. By that time, democratic ideals were universally
recognized, and Konvitz saw progress being made toward
their realization. He cited four developments as proof that
progress had been made toward realizing democratic ideals
almost everywhere: "the victory of women in their struggle
for equal dignity and equal rights; the worldwide recogni-
tion of racial equality, and the rejection of any notion of
racial superiority or the right to practice racial discrimina-
tion; the universal rejection of slavery, peonage, economic
castes, or the right to exploit one group for the economic
advantage of another; and acceptance of the idea that reli-
gious persecution and coercion of the conscience cannot be
jus tified in the name of religion or on behalf of the claims of
any social order." 22
Judaism and Human Rights, published in 1972, and
Judaism and the American Idea, published in 1978, dealt
almost entirely with ideals. Konvitz's approach in his essays
in these works was comparative. He viewed Judaic and
American ideals in relation to each other and discussed their
similarities, differences, common sources, and points of
convergence. These later studies provide a basis for under-
20. Quoted in Konvitz and Leskes, A Century of Civil Rights, p. 4.
21. Ibid., p. vii.
22. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, pp. 375-76.
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standing his earlier works. The ideals most important to
Konvitz were love, justice, human dignity, equality, free-
dom, and the rule of law. Because they were fundamental in
practically all of his works, they will be considered at some
length.
III
For Konvitz, love is the ultimate ideal. What does it mean?
"I spent a lifetime trying to define it," he once said in
conversation. "Obviously it encompasses a lot of other
values. But in trying to understand it, the starting point for
me is the commandment: 'Love thy neighbor as thyself.'
"
"Christianity," he went on, "emphasizes the first part of
the commandment. Indeed, there is one version in the gos-
pels that states only love thy neighbor. Judaism emphasizes
that last part of the commandment. You begin with your-
self. As God created you, you must love yourself. You must
treat yourself lovingly. That does not mean egotistically.
But it does mean treating one's self understandingly, com-
passionately, intelligently, properly. For example, a young
Yehudi Menuhin, discovering he is a musical genius,
should show his love for himself by working hard at the gift
he possesses. That is neither egotistical nor self-indulgent.
The same is true of a scholar working at his vocation. He
treats himself lovingly when he refuses to be diverted by
lesser pleasures and devotes his full energies to the pursuit
of truth. On the other hand, a man who devotes all his time
to making money without regard for other values abuses
and destroys himself. He does not treat himself lovingly as
the commandment requires. Now, if you love your neigh-
bor properly, you will not indulge him. Loving your neigh-
bor does not mean giving him everything he wants. To love
your neighbor means to treat him as you should treat your-
self. That takes judgment. We are not talking about roman-
tic love or feeling. One might feel revulsion toward another
yet treat him lovingly. The commandment requires objec-
tive not subjective love. A judge may feel enormous sym-
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pathy for the poor and helpless, yet he must be impartial.
He must be disciplined. His heart may break; nonetheless
he must do what is right."23
Although love is Konvitz's ultimate ideal, he has not
written much about it. The same is true of the ideal of
justice. Occasionally one comes across a statement like the
following, connecting justice with Judaism: "The ideal of
equal justice was a basic Biblical commandment; for exam-
ple, 'You shall do no injustice in judgment; you shall not be
partial to the poor or defer to the great, but in righteousness
shall you judge your neighbor.' "24 But nowhere does he
discuss the ideal generally or at length. One reason may be
that justice is usually defined in terms of some other ideal or
value. For Konvitz, justice appears to be defined in terms of
love. If one loves his neighbor properly-as Konvitz
described love-then he acts justly.
Other ideals-particularly human dignity-receive
more attention than love and justice in his writings.
Because the movement in Konvitz's scholarship has been
generally from the particular to the universal and from the
concrete to the abstract, a detailed discussion of the Judaic
conceptions of love and justice may come in future writ-
ings. There are good reasons for considering human dignity
before love, and they are in Konvitz's essay, "Human Dig-
nity: From Creation to Constitution," in Judaism and the
American Idea. In that essay he describes a disputation
between two great ancient rabbis-Akiba and Ben Azzai-as
to which is the most fundamental principle in the Torah.
Akiba quoted Leviticus: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
thyself." Ben Azzai quoted Genesis: "This is the book of the
generations of Adam [man]. When God created man
[Adam] He made him in the likeness of God."25 After point-
ing out that the issue between the rabbis was not which was
the greatest commandment but which was the most funda-
23. Conversations with Milton R. Konvitz, August, 1977.
24. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. 383.
25. Konvitz, Judaism and the American Idea, p. 44.
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mental principle, Konvitz gave his VIew as to the more
convincing argument:
Ben Azzai' s answer is by far the more convincing one, for
without it the love commandment has no metaphysical
base; it stands as a naked assertion of God's will, in no way
different from many other commandments. But the text
chosen by Ben Azzai goes to the very nature of man, for it
says that all men are the children of one father; that just as
their father-Adam-was made in the image of God, so
each man, a son of Adam, is made in God's image; that there
is only one human family; that all human beings are born
with equal human dignity; that all human beings are
equal. It is on the basis of this principle-this klal gadal-
that God, the maker of Adam, can say to the children of
Adam: 'Love thy neighbor as thyself.'26
Thus if we accord our neighbor true human dignity, we
shall fulfill the requirements of the love commandment and
justice.
What does it mean to say that man has dignity? It means,
wrote Konvitz, that "he has a head on his shoulders and he
walks upright; he has a moral sense, he has intelligence, he
uncovers the secrets of the universe. He is a creature within
the universe, yet he is of a nature that transcends the uni-
verse, and so he is at one and the same time the most noble
thing in the universe and more noble than the universe." 27
It means God talks to him and that he talks to God. He can
say to God: "Lord of the universe, listen to me, I am about to
sing a lovely song; look at me, for I am about to create a
beautiful painting; turn toward me, and You will see tha tin
a moment there will be love in the world, as I take this
woman to be my wife; watch, Lord, as I increase justice in
the world by lessening a poor man's misery; I am about to
create mercy and loving-kindness as I operate on a patient,
or go into a strange distant land to fight malaria or sleeping
sickness; and once more, Lord, look at me as I land on the
26. Ibid.
27. Milton R. Konvitz, "Man's Dignity in God's World" in Konvitz,
ed., Judaism and Human Rights, pp. 27-38.
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moon, and watch me as I discover stars that have not been in
the heavens for thousands of years." 28
Important in the God-man relationship in Judaism is
its directness; nothing intervenes between God and man. It
is at odds with the Socratic idea of the preeminent position
of the state. On the day Socrates drank the cup of hemlock,
he was still awed by the thought of all he owed Athens. It
was the law of Athens that made his father and mother
husband and wife and gave legitimacy to his birth. It had
educated him-trained him in literature, music, dancing,
and gymnastics. If it now required his death, so be it; he was
a child of the state. In Judaism, man is a creature of God, not
the state. This notion is as Lockean as it is Judaic; indeed,
Locke's ideas in this regard were essentially Biblical, wrote
Konvitz, "though admittedly weathered by the forces of
many centuries of religious, intellectual, political, and eco-
nomic history." 29The consequence of this position is that
men and women are more than citizens. They have rights
above and beyond anything granted by the state; indeed,
they have rights even against the state. Those rights are, as
Jefferson said, inalienable and inseparable from man's
God-given nature. Konvitz put it in these words:
We cannot divest ourselves of this God-given nature. The
time may come for us to become citizens of Athens or Rome
or Jerusalem, but our citizenship will not be all absorbing.
We will always retain certain rights and liberties, certain
powers and dignities-prerogatives that we enjoy as gifts
from the Giver of gifts, and which we can never lose.3O
The realization of the ideal of human dignity, Konvitz
suggested in this passage, begins with the belief that the
goodness and wisdom of God are somehow reflected in all
human beings and is achieved by human actions consistent
with that belief, actions that show love for one's neighbor.
The distinction between man and citizen that arises
inevitably from the ideal of human dignity has important
consequences. The distinction is explicit in the title of the
28. Ibid., p. 29-30.
29. Konvitz, Judaism and the American Idea, p. 36.
30. Ibid., p. 38.
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French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizen.
The American Bill of Rights applies to people, not just
citizens, and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
protect the rights of "persons." The United Nations
Declaration of Human Rights applies to "all human
beings" and provides that "everyone is entitled to all the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth, or status." These documents, Kon-
vitz wrote, state the essentially Jeffersonian view that "since
human rights are different from, though basic to, the rights
of citizens, they are not dependent upon any constitution,
upon the grant from any ruler or government. The funda-
mental human rights are provided for in the unwritten
constitution of human nature-a constitution that is
beyond the reach of any government or earthly power."31
The ideals of human dignity and equality are necessar-
ily related because the former implies the latter. Thus the
equality ideal has its roots in both the Judaic and American
traditions. Its most significant statement, however, was Jef-
ferson's in the Declaration of Independence. When Jeffer-
son wrote that "all men are created equal," he knew that all
men were not in fact equal; he had stated an ideal, a promise
to be redeemed in the future. As Konvitz explained:
When men are judged by any empirical test they are not
equal: some are richer than others, some wiser, some swif-
ter, some more beautiful. Yet the essence of democracy is
equality. Men reject the empirical tests and assert their
equality notwithstanding the evidence adduced by their
eyesand ears and other senses. . . .The belief in equality is a
transcendental belief, if you wish; it makes an assertion
which may be true only in the world of noumena. But no
matter: it is the cornerstone of the democratic faith and the
essence of moral idealism.32
The Supreme Court took an important step toward the
redemption of the promise of equality when it decided
31. Ibid., p. 40.
32. Konvitz, ed., Judaism and Human Rights, p. 120.
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Brown v. Board of Education in 1954. To Konvitz, the
decision did not and could not turn on social science evi-
dence or results of social experiment butrather on "a consti-
tutional ideal, its meaning, implications, and applications."
Discussing that ideal, he wrote:
The ideal of constitutional equality is not the result of a
social experiment; it is a force that is intended to generate
experiments in the faith that they will work toward the
enhancement of 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.'
There were no social psychologists or sociologists to advise
Jefferson as he worked on the Declaration of Independence,
or Madison as he worked on the Bill or Rights, or the
Congress as it drafted and passed the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments. The constitutional requirement is
that the state must treat its citizens-all men-as equals, as
if all the weight of scientific authority in fact supported the
proposition that all men are in fact equal, no matter
whether such scientific authority in fact exists or not (as it
did not exist in 1776, or 1789, or 1865, or 1868, and mayor
may not have existed in 1954.)33
In Brown, the ideal of equality moved toward realiza-
tion through an arm of the state-the Supreme Court-by
application of a constitutional principle-the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Though the
ideal is imbedded in the equal protection clause, Konvitz
stressed that it was "not granted by any constitution but
found in the constitution of man himsel£."34
Like equality, freedom is implied in the ideal of human
dignity, and again Konvitz found its most significant state-
ment in the writings of Jefferson: freedom is God-given,
inalienable.
In making a plea for religious freedom in Israel in 1949,
Konvitz gave his personal conception of the ideal as follows:
Now I personally do not eat non-kosher food, but I make
my choice as a free man; I choose kosher food with a free
will; and since I choose it freely, my act has spiritual value
to me. If I had no choice but to eat only kosher food, because
the law so decreed, I would choke on it. Having eaten the
33. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. 170.
34. Konvitz, ed., Judaism and Human Rights, p. 25.
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bread of freedom, the bread of compulsion would be bread
of affliction. . . .
. . . if a man has no freedom to sin, he has no freedom to
do good[.)35
The conception is Jeffersonian. "Almighty God hath
created the mind free," Jefferson wrote. Adopting that state-
ment, Konvitz added: "[m ]an is not man unless his mind
remains free; and. . . God is not served except by a mind that
is free." 36This is the essence of the ideal for Konvitz. It is
intimately related to freedom of conscience, which has
sources in the Old and New Testament and in the writings
of Sophocles, Plato, and St. Thomas Aquinas; freedom of
religious conscience became the basis for religious tolera-
tion, which had been urged by Spinoza, More, Erasmus and
Locke; and religious toleration became the basis of reli-
gious freedom in the First Amendment. But the core of the
ideal of freedom-the free mind-embraces nonreligious as
well as religious conscience; it embraces all thought, pro-
fane as well as sacred, and the expression of thought; and it
also embraces association of human beings who share sim-
ilar ideas and attitudes. It is this core notion of the ideal that
makes certain liberties fundamental.
Konvitz saw the ideal of the rule of law as a necessary
condition for the protection of freedom and other demo-
cratic ideals. He said that "no people can be free, no demo-
cracy can continue to exist, if the rulers selected by the people
do not consider themselves bound by the law. There must be
limitations on rulers if the individual's rights are to be
preserved. The citizen's rights are measured by the re-
strictions on government. There must, in other words, be a
constitution which defines clearly how far the government
may go in this matter or that delegated to its authority.
Israel had such a constitution in the Torah. No one was
above it. Only under the Torah could kings rule and judges
35. Milton R. Konvitz,
"A Plea for Religious Freedom in Israel,"
Commentary, 8 (1949), pp. 224-25.
36. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. 29.
80 RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND IDEALS
judge. As God is righteous, so must the king be, as God
defends the weak, so must the king. Only justice is the
foundation of a people's happiness and stability. . . . With-
out law there is not freedom. Unless a people meditate on
the statutes and delight in the Law, they will not be able to
walk at ease; unequal strength will lead to unequal justice;
and when justice is dead, said Kant, it is better not to be
alive." 37
Americans, Konvitz believed, are committed to the rule
of law. They might show displeasure with specific Supreme
Court decisions and might even abuse them, but they accept
generally the Court as final interpreter of their fundamental
law. Even presidents must abide by the Court's decisions, as
the Steel Seizure case in 1952 and the Nixon Tapes case in
1974 show. That is not to say that Americans believe the
Supreme Court is infallible or that it has not made mis takes;
it made serious errors in cases like Dred Scott and
Plessy v. Ferguson. But the institutionalization of self-
criticism in the form of the dissenting opinions and later
overruling of erroneous decisions has tended to redeem the
Court in the eyes of the people. Indeed, dissenting opinions
and the willingness to overrule decisions has, in Konvitz's
opinion, "contributed to the high and secure position the
Court enjoys in national judgment and esteem."38
The same is true in Judaism. Konvitz wrote "the fact
that the Jewish people accepted the teachings of the school
of Rabbi Ismael that 'The Torah speaks in the language of
man' and that therefore there were bound to be differences
of opinion over what law is and requires, in no way wea-
kened the halakhic (legal) hold over the mind and heart of
the Jew."39
Important as the rule of law is, it is not absolute. There
are dangers in respecting it too much, Konvitz thought, for
it might become an idol. There are times when moral claims
become superior to the claims of the state, when a person
37. Konvitz, ed., Judaism and Human Rights, pp. 138-39.
38. Konvitz, Judaism and the American Idea, p. 58.
39. Ibid.
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not only has the right but the duty of civil disobedience. But
to Konvitz civil disobedience-nonviolent resistance to
unjust laws-was compatible with the rule of law. He
stressed that "nonviolent resistance means to affirm the
general legal order and the rule of law; and that by trying to
purify that order, to remove from it an intolerable evil, it
acts to conserve rather than to destroy. By reminding us that
laws must be just if they deserve respect and observance,
nonviolent resistance refreshes the living mainsprings of
law and order."4O
In his consideration of civil disobedience, Konvitz dis-
cussed an instance of mass nonviolent resistance reported by
Josephus in which a large assembly of Jews insisted that the
Romans not place statues of the Emperor Gaius in the
Temple, for that would violate God's law, and they would
resist it even if it meant death. To those Jews it was not a
question of the right of civil disobedience; they had the duty
of civil disobedience. Judaism required disobedience to laws
commanding the doing of an immoral act, killing another,
and idolatry, and such disobedience was compatible with
the rule of law. Konvitz explained it this way:
It was not a question of what one's conscience dictated, but
what the law-the Higher Law, the law that is superior to
what purports to be the law of the state-demanded. An act
could, therefore, appear to be an act of civil disobedience
while in reality it was an act of obedience-disobedience of
a lower law, which was in fact no law at all when tested
against the Higher Law, like a statute, ordinance, or court
judgment that is without legal force because it is
unconstitutional. 41
Man knows the Higher Law through his conscience,
wrote Konvitz, but in Judaism "conscience is not a voice
that speaks out of man; it is a hearing agency given to man
so that he may hear the voice of God." 42Thus, according to
that view, conscience has a reporting but not a legislative
function. It does not make law but tells the individual when
40. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. 306.
41. Konvitz, Judaism and the American Idea, p. 105.
42. Ibid., p. 106.
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a law transcending life requires certain action and whether
it has been violated. "The law," Konvitz wrote, "calls to the
person; the call is heard in and by the heart; but it is not the
voice of man that is heard but the voice of God or the law.
Man is true to himself only by being true to the law." 43
Whether one views conscience as having only a report-
ing function or a reporting and a legislative function, it
provides the moral basis of law. Konvitz viewed that moral
basis and the ideals implicit in it as more important than
law. He stated his position clearly in Expanding Liberties
in a single italicized sentence:
Law itself is subject to the moral judgment; and justice,
human dignity, and human rights are more fundamental
than law. 44
For Konvitz, then, the rule of law is important for the
protection of freedom and equality that the ideal of human
dignity requires. But law is instrumental; it may give rights
and it may also deny them. So the ideals of human dignity,
equality, and freedom are more important, and they are
important primarily because through them love and justice
can be realized.
Thus, Konvitz's thought comes together in a coherent
philosophy in which law, rights, liberties, and ideals are
interdependent. Law is important because it guarantees
rights; rights are important because they are the basis of
liberties; and ideals give life to law, rights, and liberties.
43. Ibid., p. 107.
44. Konvitz, Expanding Liberties, p. 305.
